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The Twice and Future President:
Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-
Second Amendment
Bruce G. Peabodyt & Scott E. Ganttt
INTRODUCTION
It appears to be a commonly held view that when Bill
Clinton's second term expires, he will be constitutionally
prohibited from serving again as President of the United
States.1 This, we believe, is decidedly incorrect. The Twenty-
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution states
that "[nlo person shall be elected to the office of the President
more than twice."2 Although a twice-elected President may not
again be "elected" to that Office, there are a number of
circumstances in which such a person may still "serve" as
President. We examine these circumstances in this Article.
t B.A. 1991, Wesleyan University; Ph.D. candidate in Government,
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1. See, e.g., Lionel Van Deerlin, Second-Term Curse Befalls Bill Clinton,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 12, 1997, at Bli, available in LI S, News
Library, US File (explaining that after his second term Clinton "cannot serve
again"); see also Plugge v. McCuen, 841 S.W.2d 139, 148 (Ark. 1992) (stating
that "the twenty-second Amendment ... limits the President to eight years of
service") (Dudley, J., dissenting).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, §1. The Amendment further states that
"no person who has held the office of President or acted as President, for more
than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President
shall be elected to the office of the President more than once." Id. The
Twenty-Second Amendment also stipulates that it did not apply "to any
person holding the office of President" when it was proposed (exempting then-
President Truman from its effects), and provides that it "shall not prevent any
person who may be holding the office of President or acting as President,
during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the




While distinguishing between "election" and "service" may
seem a matter of semantic parsing, we believe this
differentiation is constitutionally significant and consequently,
we contend that the Twenty-Second Amendment proscribes
only the reelection of an already twice-elected President.3
The widespread misunderstanding about what the
Twenty-Second Amendment actually prohibits4 is in large
measure due to the fact that it has been infrequently examined
by courts and academicians. And who can blame them? Since
the Amendment was ratified in 1951, only three Presidents
before Clinton (Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan) have been
elected to a second term,5 and none of them ever expressed any
genuine interest in testing its legal parameters. Moreover, the
relatively straightforward text of the Amendment seemingly
provides little material for scholars to probe. As a result, there
3. When using the phrase "twice-elected" we acknowledge that under
the Twenty-Second Amendment a person 'who has. . . acted as President, for
more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected" is
treated as if "elected" for purposes of determining eligibility for reelection.
See id. For the duration of this Article we shall use the phrases "previously
twice-elected" and "already twice-elected" to include such circumstances.
4. In addition to being described as preventing an already twice-elected
President from "serving" again, see supra note 1, the Amendment also has
been described as limiting a President's "terms" in Office. See, e.g., Akhil
Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913, 939 (1992)
(stating that the Twenty-Second Amendment "limits Presidents to two
terms"); Bruce E. Fein, Original Intent and the Constitution, 47 M.D. L. REV.
196, 206 (1987) ("[TIhe twenty-second amendment limits a President to two
terms"); Stephen M. Griffin, The Problem of Constitutional Change, 70 TUL. L.
REV. 2121, 2138 (1996) (noting that the Twenty-Second Amendment "limit[s]
the President to two terms"); Sean Wilentz, Over the Hill, NEW REP., Oct. 12,
1992, at 40 ("As every schoolchild should know . . . the Twenty-Second
Amendment... limits presidents to two elected terms in office.").
Still others describe the Amendment as limiting presidential "tenure."
See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, The Center Moves, the Center Remains, 40 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 877, 888 (1996) (stating that the Twenty-Second Amendment
imposes "a two-term limit on any president's tenure"); Neil Gorsuch &
Michael Guzman, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense of the
Constitutionality of State-Imposed Term Limits, 20 HOFsTRA L. REV. 341, 346
n.24 (1991) (stating that the Twenty-Second Amendment limits presidential
tenure to two four-year terms").
In general, interpretation and understanding of the Amendment would be
advanced were commentators to describe more precisely the effect of the
Amendment. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 491 (1989) (explaining that "the Twenty-Second
Amendment forbade the President from seeking a third elected term in
office").
5. Although Nixon resigned before completing his second term, he was
formally prohibited by the Amendment from being elected to a third term.
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is a dearth of legal scholarship about the Amendment,6 and the
infrequent references to it tend to assume (in our view,
incorrectly) that it is clear and its interpretation unproblematic.7
This Article attempts to redress some of the inattention to
the Twenty-Second Amendment. We strive to contribute to the
understanding of the Amendment by exploring its history, its
text, and its meaning. More specifically, the first major part of
this Article (Part H) examines the political and legal traditions
that gave rise to the Twenty-Second Amendment, helping to
place the Amendment in historical context. In Part 11 we
consider, in turn, discussions of the issue of presidential
reeligibility at the Constitutional Convention, how the issue
played out in presidential elections leading up to Franklin
Roosevelt's third and fourth terms (which spurred the
subsequent adoption of the Twenty-Second Amendment), and a
long line of congressional efforts to limit presidential tenure.
We then examine in some detail the debates and political
processes that led to Congress's approval of the Amendment
and its eventual ratification by the states. Finally, we
conclude our historical analysis by surveying reactions to, and
assessments of, the Amendment since its enactment.
With this historical background in mind, the second major
part of this Article (Part Il) focuses on what we consider the
central interpretive issue presented by the Amendment-
identifying what, precisely, it proscribes and allows. We
examine this issue by exploring and testing the constitutional-
ity of six scenarios in which an already twice-elected President
6. See John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 470, 494 (1997) (calling the Twenty-Second Amendment a
"forgotten friend").
7. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges
and Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701, 714-15
n.55 (1995) (commenting that any prejudice stemming from the deferral of
lawsuits against a sitting President is tempered because "the Twenty-Second
Amendment... itself assures that plaintiffs will not have to wait more than
eight years .... In rare cases, the Amendment would allow a person to serve
as President for ten years."); Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My
Critics, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1869, 1894 (1994) (explaining that the Twenty-Second
Amendment "prohibits a President from serving three terms"); Johnathan
Mansfield, A Choice Approach to the Constitutionality of Term Limitation
Laws, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 966, 994 (1993) (calling the Twenty-Second
Amendment a "simple[ I solution"); see also Blow to Term Limits, UNION
LEADER (Manchester, NH), May 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ACRNWS File ("The Twenty-Second Amendment... provide[s] a definite
term limit.") (emphasis added).
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might reassume Office, acting as or again becoming President.8
Specifically, we examine whether the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment, or some other constitutional provision, precludes a
previously twice-elected President from:
(1) serving as Vice President9 and then becoming President
in the case of removal, death or resignation of the President;10
(2) serving as Vice President and then acting as President
during a period in which the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of the Office, as authorized by (a) a
written declaration from the President him or herself,11 or (b)
other constitutional mechanisms; 12
(3) becoming Vice President-elect and then President if "at
the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President,
the President-elect shall have died";13
(4) becoming Vice President-elect and then acting as
President if "a President shall not have been chosen before the
time fixed for the beginning of [the] term, or if the President-
elect shall have failed to qualify; 14
(5) acting as President under circumstances provided for
by the Succession Act of 1947,15 which comes into play if (a) the
President and the Vice President both die, resign, or are
unable to discharge their duties,16 or (b) the President-elect
8. The Constitution distinguishes between "acting" as President and
"being" or "becoming" President. Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1, cl. 6
(elaborating conditions under which a person might "act as President") with
id. amend. XX, § 3 (explaining terms under which a Vice President-elect "shall
become President"). See also Scott E. Gant & Bruce G. Peabody, Musings on
a Constitutional Mystery: Missing Presidents and "Headless Monsters"?, 14
CONST. COMm. 83, 87 n.14 (1997). Here, we consider acting as President and
being President as different ways of "serving" as President.
9. Later we take up the question of whether a previously twice-elected
President can subsequently serve as Vice President. See infra Part III.
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
11. See id. § 3.
12. See id. § 4. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment authorizes "the Vice
President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive
departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide" to submit
a "written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office" with the effect that the Vice President shall then act
as President.
13. Id. amend. XX, § 3.
14. Id.
15. 3 U.S.C. §19 (1994).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 6. This was much more likely to have
occurred prior to the ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which
provides for the filling of the vice presidency should it become vacant. Prior
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and the Vice President-elect are both constitutionally un-
qualified to hold office; 17
(6) becoming President if so chosen by the House of
Representatives in the event no person received a majority of
the electoral votes in an election for President. 18
Part I's assessment of the constitutionality of these six
basic scenarios 9 begins with what might be described as a
to 1967, when the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was ratified, the vice presidency
had been vacant sixteen times. See GEORGE C. EDWARDS I & STEPHEN J.
WAYNE, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: POLITICS AND POLICY MAKING 460 (1994).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3 (empowering Congress to "provide for
the case wherein neither a President-elect nor a Vice President-elect shall
have qualified").
While Congress has passed a single statute to provide for the succession
circumstances referenced in both Article II, § 1 and the Twentieth
Amendment, it might have chosen instead to enact separate laws addressing
the contingencies described by these constitutional provisions. Furthermore,
while the Succession Act of 1947 is the current "law of the land," this
legislation might change in the future; indeed we speculate later about the
wisdom and propriety of revised succession legislation.
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. We presume that this is the scenario
most likely to be viewed as legally suspect. It hinges upon the idea that the
House's "choosing" of a President is not an "election." If the House does not
"elect" a President through its "choosing," then a twice-elected President
might not only reassume the Office as the House's choice as provided for in
the Twelfth Amendment, but also through a statute (as yet unpassed) allowed
for by the Twentieth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, §4 (stating
that "Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the
persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President
whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them").
19. It may be helpful to conceptualize our scenarios by organizing them
temporally, grouping them by stages in the electoral process. Thus, Scenario
6 would take place only if the election had been thrown to the House;
Scenarios 3, 4, and 5b would occur only if a President and Vice President had
been "elected" but had not yet formally entered Office and begun their terms;
and Scenarios 1, 2, and 5a could occur only once a term-as defined by the
Twentieth Amendment-had begun (and the President and Vice President
had actually been elected).
Scenarios 3, 4 and 5b, then, necessarily beg the question of when has an
"election" taken place and a presidential candidate become a President-elect.
Does this occur after the national election? Is it after the electoral college has
convened and cast its votes, but not yet announced them or had them formally
counted? Or is it after it has convened and had its votes counted and certified
by the President of the Senate and Congress (as specified by the Twelfth
Amendment)? If a person is considered President-elect only upon having his
or her status certified by the electoral college's formal announcement, what is
the constitutional status of a candidate who dies after the college has cast its
votes but before it has convened? For a general discussion of some of these




conventional legal analysis of the scenarios, examining the text
and legislative history of the Twenty-Second Amendment as
well as other constitutional provisions to assess whether a
twice-elected President could again occupy the Office of
President after the expiration of his or her second term. We
then discuss whether the "spirit" of the Constitution (or the
spirit of the Twenty-Second Amendment) may bear on our
inquiry and provide a basis for declaring that one or several of
the scenarios outlined above would be unconstitutional,
regardless of the results of our conventional legal analysis.20
H1. BACKGROUND AND ANTECEDENTS OF THE
TWENTY-SECOND AMENDMENT
While much of the proximate impetus for adopting the
Twenty-Second Amendment seems to have derived from
partisan opposition to the policies and legacies associated with
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his unprecedented four terms
of presidential service, supporters of the Amendment-before
and after its ratification-have argued that it codified a
longstanding tradition of presidential term limits. We begin
our examination of the Amendment by uncovering its historical
and legal roots.21
A. THE FOUNDING AND THE CONVENTION DEBATES
When the American colonies declared independence in
1776, they generally favored weak executives and strong leg-
20. Some may suggest that the scenarios set out in this Article are
implausible because the nation would never countenance a President
continuing his or her service through the methods we have identified, and
that the scenarios therefore fail to warrant the attention we have given them.
We disagree for a number of reasons, among these our belief that what is
unimaginable today might become conceivable in the future. Cf. D.M.
Risinger, Honesty in. Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some 'Striking' Problems
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 57 (1976)
(arguing that "[t]oday's frivolity may be tomorrow's law" and noting further
that "the law often grows by an organic process in which a concept is
conceived, then derided as absurd (and clearly not the law), then accepted as
theoretically tenable (though not the law), then accepted as the law").
Moreover, part of taking constitutionalism seriously is to stretch and test the
terms of our constitutional document and the traditions and practices that it
helps to generate. We have tried to do so here.
21. Part II generally puts off prolonged discussion of how our historical
observations bear on the six scenarios; these issues are examined closely in
Part III.
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islatures.22 Post-independence state constitutions reflected
this preference; in addition to limiting the executive to a short
term of office, a number of states prohibited reelection. 23 Even
before the Articles of Confederation were adopted in 1781, the
disinclination to recognize a strong, independent executive was
manifest at the national level, where executive powers and
officers were controlled by the Continental Congress. 24 The
presiding officer in Congress, the president, exercised a
number of executive functions including meeting with state
executive officers and foreign heads of state. In addition, "a
principle of rotation was firmly established for presidents [of
the Continental Congress], no doubt reflecting once again the
fear of executive power as a potential threat to liberty."25 The
Articles of Confederation formally provided that the president
not serve "more than one year in any term of three years."26
During the Constitutional Convention the question of how
long the President should serve was discussed extensively.27 In
debates on the question during the summer of 1787, Edmund
Randolph, Governor of Virginia and author of the nationalist
"Virginia Plan" for the Constitution (much of which was
ultimately adopted in the final version of the document),28
called for an executive chosen by the national legislature and
ineligible for more than one term of service. Measures
proposed by other Convention delegates left the question of
reeligibility open-ended and called for some form of pres-
idential election, as opposed to selection by the legislature. 29
22. See Thomas E. Cronin, Presidential Term, Tenure and Reeligibility, in
INVENTING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 61, 62 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1989).
23. See id. at 62-63.
24. See id. at 64.
25. Id.
26. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX.
27. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION DEBATES 118-19, 130-31, 141, 166-68, 170 (Ralph Ketcham ed.,
1986) [hereinafter ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS]; 2 JAIES MADISON, THE
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 48, 270, 274, 282, 287, 313,
318-23, 325 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1987). According to
political scientist Thomas Cronin, "at least sixty votes were taken on the
issues of the proper length of term for the president, of who should do the
electing, and of reeligibility." Cronin, supra note 22, at 65.
28. See SAMUTJEL ELIOT MORISON ET AL., A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 115-16 (2d ed. 1983).
29. Early versions of the Constitution included a proposal that the
President be directly elected by the federal legislature. Critics charged that
the only way to guarantee an independent executive under this arrangement
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By July 26, the Convention approved a plan in which the
executive was to be chosen by Congress for a term of seven
years, with no reeligibility.30 Opponents of this plan, including
Alexander Hamilton 3' and Gouverneur Morris, argued in favor
of reeligibility and the Committee of Eleven (to which a
number of unresolved issues had been referred by the
Convention delegates) suggested that the Convention adopt a
four-year presidential term.32 On September 15, an acceptable
compromise was finally reached, and the Convention agreed to
a four-year term with election by an electoral college and no
restriction on reeligibility.33 Morris, author of the New York
state constitution and Pennsylvania delegate to the
Convention,34 was among the most vocal and forceful in
arguing against limiting presidential reeligibility. He
maintained that without the option of reeligibility, Presidents
would lose their appetite for "public esteem" and their "love of
fame . . . the great spring to noble and illustrious action."35
Morris also thought that limiting the presidential term of
service would incline a President to corruption and to
"accumulate wealth and provide for his friends."36 And he
intimated that constitutional restrictions on the terms of
presidential service might simply give way during a crisis: "In
moments of pressing danger the tried abilities and established
was to limit service to one term. See ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note
27, at 119, 130. The insistence of some Convention delegates that the
President be "elected" rather than chosen by the legislature may lend some
support to our supposition that the House of Representatives' "choosing" of a
President (under the terms of the Twelfth Amendment) is not an "election" as
the term is used in the Twenty-Second Amendment. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text (discussion of Scenario 6).
30. See ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 27, at 141. Specifically,
Article Ten of the August 6, 1787 version of the Constitution stated that the
President "shall hold his office during the term of seven years; but shall not be
elected a second time." Id.
31. At one point during the Convention proceedings Hamilton proposed
that the chief executive be chosen for life, remaining in office as long as he
maintained "good behavior." See STEPHEN W. STATHIS, PRESIDENTIAL
TENURE: A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S TERM OF OFFICE,
CONG. RES. SERV. REP. No. 81-129, at 10 (1981).
32. See Cronin, supra note 22, at 68.
33. See 2 MADISON, supra note 27, at 323.
34. While beginning his career in New York, Morris was appointed as a
Pennsylvania delegate to the Constitutional Convention with the support of
his political mentor, Robert Morris. See THE READER'S COMPANION TO
AMERICAN HISTORY 750-51 (Eric Foner & John A. Garraty eds., 1991).
35. ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 27, at 117.
36. Id.
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character of a favorite Magistrate will prevail over respect for
the forms of the Constitution."37
After the Convention closed, resistance to open-ended
service persisted, as some critics voiced concerns that reeligible
Presidents would "endanger the public liberty."38 The Virginia,
New York and North Carolina ratifying conventions called for
amendments prohibiting the President from serving more than
two terms.39 But the merits of not limiting presidential
reeligibility were revisited in The Federalist. In Federalist No.
69 Hamilton elaborated how the Constitution was premised on
a reeligible executive, with democratic checks to counter the
threat of a tyrannical President (or a servile President
continually installed by a domineering Congress in elections
thrown to the House).40 The President, Hamilton explained, "is
to be elected for four years; and is to be re-eligible as often as
the people of the United States shall think him worthy of their
confidence."41
Defense of a (potentially perpetually) reeligible President
was further developed in Federalist No. 72, which asserted
that a number of evils flowed from limiting the number of
terms a President could serve. In arguments reminiscent of
those employed by Morris, Hamilton asserted that presidential
term limits would remove "inducements to good behavior" and
diminish the incentives of ambitious politicians to pursue the
public good.42 Moreover, a brief or fixed tenure would provide a
greater temptation to abuse power. Term limits would also
needlessly exclude the wisdom and insights of experienced
Presidents, which would be especially important for
overcoming crises in the new republic. In addition, electoral
continuity was needed to promote stable and consistent
37. Id. This argument was made 160 years later by Democratic
opponents of the Twenty-Second Amendment. The power of Morris's
arguments is suggested by their continuing resonance among those
supporting presidential reeligibility before and alter the ratification of the
Twenty-Second Amendment.
38. Id. at 166.
39. See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF
WE LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE
IT? 150 (1993).
40. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 415-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
41. Id. at 416.
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
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policies. Ultimately, these arguments prevailed and the
Constitution was adopted with the original Convention language
intact-that is, without a limit on presidential service.
B. THE Two-TERM LIMIT: A CHERISHED TRADITION?
There seems to be something of a consensus among
scholars that, starting with George Washington's refusal to run
for a third term in 1796, a presidential two-term tradition was
founded and continued uncontested until Roosevelt's reelection
to a third term in 1940. As David Kyvig puts it in his history
of constitutional amendments, the notion that a President
should serve no longer than two terms was "established by
George Washington, reinforced by Thomas Jefferson, and
observed for one reason or another by the seven other once-
reelected chief executives" up to FDR.43 Similarly, FDR
historian Doris Kearns Goodwin offers that "[e]ver since
George Washington refused a third term, no man had even
tried to achieve the office of the Presidency more than twice.""
But a close inspection of the debates on presidential term
limits between 1789 and 1939, as well as an examination of
political practices during that period, casts doubt upon these
accounts of presidential reeligibility. To begin with (as we
discuss below), Washington himself did not appear to favor
limiting the number of times a President could serve.
Furthermore, even Jefferson, the President most strongly
associated with presidential term limits and the principle of
"rotation in office," suggested that there were circumstances
43. DAVID KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 325 (1996); see also LOUIS W. KOENIG, THE
CHIEF EXECUTIVE 64 (1964) ("IThe principle of unlimited eligibility for re-
election was innocently but irreparably undermined in practice by the man in
whose behalf it had been established, George Washington himself."); SIDNEY
M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 90 (1994)
("[Washington's] retirement set a precedent for limiting presidents to two
terms that endured for nearly 150 years."); ALAN GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND
THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 114 (1978) ("There was no argument
that the two-term tradition had been begun by Washington, supported by
Jefferson, and observed by all succeeding Presidents prior to Franklin
Roosevelt."); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 43
(1948) ("[T]he custom which limits any individual's tenure of the presidential
office to two terms was initiated by Washington himself.... ."); Johnathan
Mansfield, A Choice Approach to the Constitutionality of Term Limitation
Laws, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 966, 995 (1993) (explaining that "George
Washington established th[e] precedent" that Presidents should refuse to seek
a third-term).
44. DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, No ORDINARY TE 106 (1994).
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under which a third term would be appropriate. And even if,
prior to the Twenty-Second Amendment, there was an
unwritten rule that Presidents should not seek a third term, it
was a rule questioned by a number of Presidents after
Jefferson, and challenged-politically, but not legally--by
others.45 Whatever the precise contours of the "two-term
tradition" of presidential service, until 1940 (when its
abandonment was implicitly sanctioned with the election of
FDR to a third term), it seems to have led what Paul and
George Willis describe as something of a "precarious life."46 If
this perspective is correct, then a better understanding of the
mixed historical attitudes towards the two-term tradition may
help refine scholarly attitudes about its significance and
provide additional insight into the purposes and scope of the
Twenty-Second Amendment.
In this analysis of presidential history prior to FDR we
seek to address a number of questions: Was there a fairly
identifiable presidential "custom" regarding the appropriate
limits of presidential tenure? If so, how was it created? What
did it proscribe? We engage these questions to clarify the
historical background of the Twenty-Second Amendment and
to assess the arguments made before and after the Twenty-
Second Amendment by those who have invoked "history" in
defense of limiting presidential service.
1. George Washington: Founder of a Two-Term Tradition?
As already noted, those recognizing a longstanding
historical custom of limited presidential service usually trace it
to President Washington.47 Some accounts of the two-term
tradition suggest that Washington's refusal to run for a third
45. In addition to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Ulysses S. Grant and
Theodore Roosevelt appear to have been prepared to serve as President for
more than two terms. See infra notes 81-83 and 91-93 and accompanying
text.
46. Paul G. Willis & George L. Willis, The Politics of the Twenty-Second
Amendment, 5 W. POL. Q. 469,469 (1952).
47. Ironically, it is the standing of Washington himself that may have
prompted the constitutional Framers to allow the president to be reeligible.
There is substantial evidence suggesting that the Framers' commitment to
reeligibility was predicated upon the understanding that Washington would
continue to serve as President. See CORWIN, supra note 43, at 43 (stating that
"the prevailing sentiment of the Convention of 1787 favored the indefinite
reeligibility of the President, a sentiment which was owing in considerable
part to the universal expectation that Washington would be the first person to
be chosen President, and would be willing to serve indefinitely").
575
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term--despite popular and political enthusiasm for his
continued service4&-helped steer the nation clear of monarchy
and established a de facto two-term limit on presidential
service.
Adherents to this conception of Washington as the "father"
of a two-term tradition point to several pieces of supporting
evidence, including a 1792 farewell address (drafted by James
Madison) that Washington intended to deliver upon completing
his first term.49 In the text, Washington described the virtues
of setting "an early example of rotation in an office of so high
and delicate a nature," and asserted that such a rotation would
"accord with the republican spirit of our Constitution, and the
ideas of liberty and safety entertained by the people."50
Washington's emphasis on "rotation in office" (a term also
invoked frequently by Jefferson)51 appears to reflect strong
opposition to open-ended service and to secure a powerful
foundation for limiting presidential service in the future.
But Washington's remarks on the importance of office
"rotation" were never conveyed to the public, since he
ultimately ran in 1792 and did not include the remarks in his
1796 farewell address. 52  Moreover, the evidence that
Washington championed presidential term limits for anyone
but himself is insubstantial. While he refused a third term in
48. Richard Brookhiser posits that "[had Washington wanted a third
term, there is no question that he would have been reelected once more."
RICHARD BROOKHISER, FOUNDING FATHER 100 (1996). On the political impact
of Washington's refusal to run for a third term, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 205-06 (1991) and BROOKHISER,
supra, at 101-03.
49. Washington was inclined to retire in 1792 after serving only one term,
but he was persuaded by Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison to make himself
eligible again, and he did not publicly resist his reelection. See BROOKHISER,
supra note 48, at 84-85. As we discuss below, there are good reasons to think
that what Washington desired for himself and what he thought appropriate
for future presidents were two different matters. See infra notes 53-55 and
accompanying text.
50. George Washington, Draft of Farewell Address (1792) in YOUNG B.
SMITH, THE THIRD TERM PRINCIPLE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE TODAY 3 (1940).
See generally STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM
290-92 (1993).
51. See our discussion of Jefferson infra Part II.B.1.b.
52. Washington's 1796 Farewell Address was based in part on his 1792
text and completed with the assistance of Alexander Hamilton, but the
language on "rotation" was not included. See SMITH, supra note 50, at 25.
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1796,53 despite continued enthusiasm for his leadership,
Washington nowhere decried continued reelection per se.
Washington seems to have retired not out of a sense of
constitutional propriety but because he wanted to leave politics
and return to Mount Vernon.54 As political scientist Thomas
Cronin put it, "Washington retired, not because he favored a
two-term tradition, but because he was tired and wanted to
return to private life."55
Moreover, it is worth recalling that Washington presided
over the Constitutional Convention that explicitly considered
and rejected limiting presidential service and enforcing
"rotation in office."56 Indeed, less than a year after the
Convention, Washington wrote to the Marquis de Lafayette,
indicating that while opinions were likely to vary,
on the eligibility of the same person for President, after he should
have served a certain course of years... I confess I differ widely
myself from Mr. Jefferson and you, as to the necessity or expediency
of rotation in that department. The matter was freely discussed in
the convention and to my full conviction.5
Washington continued: "I can see no propriety in precluding
ourselves from the services of any man who in some great
emergency shall be deemed universally most capable of serving
the public."58
To some extent, of course, Washington's beliefs about
presidential service may be less important than how his
actions have been perceived and interpreted. In this way,
Washington may have contributed to a "tradition" of two terms
of service, regardless of whether he thought it a necessary part
53. Earl Spangler notes that "Hamilton pleaded with Washington in
1797-1798 to run again in 1800." EARL SPANGLER, PRESIDENTIAL TENURE
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION 9 (1977).
54. See MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 43, at 303 ("Washington had
stepped down voluntarily from the presidency after two terms... not as a
matter of principle but because he longed for the shade of retirement.-).
55. Cronin, supra note 22, at 77.
56. For a discussion of the Convention debates concerning whether
presidential "rotation" should be secured through constitutional mechanisms,
see 2 MADISON, supra note 27, at 318-23.
57. Letter from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette (Apr. 28,
1788), reprinted in CORWIN, supra note 43, at 389.
58. Id. In 1938, Senator Simeon Fess argued against limiting presidential
service by attacking the view that Washington embraced presidential term
limits. Fess insisted "I will not admit that he believed that a third term was
vicious, or that he ever thought it was unpatriotic, or that he thought it would
not be a wise course." 93 CONG. REC. 1949 (1947) (reprinting an excerpt from
the Congressional Digest of 1938).
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of the new republic's political practices.5 9 We continue with our
investigation to see, then, if Washington's legacy was indeed
applied in a way that established a coherent custom of limited
presidential service.
2. Thomas Jefferson and the Tradition of Term Limits
Thomas Jefferson, the next President to be elected twice,
spoke unambiguously and consistently in favor of the
"necessity of rotation in office, and most particularly in the
case of the President."60 Indeed, Jefferson originally intended
to serve only one term, but decided that the "unbounded
calumnies" of his Federalist political opponents compelled him
to run again.6 1 Just before his second inauguration, Jefferson
spoke at length about his views regarding the acceptable
parameters of presidential service, concluding that he favored
Washington's example of retiring after eight years.6 2 "[A] few
more [such] precedents," Jefferson proclaimed, "Will oppose the
obstacle of habit to anyone after a while who shall endeavor to
extend his term" beyond this tenure. Jefferson explained that
his attachment to the principle of rotation and his distaste for
the "perpetual re-eligibility of the same President" was born
out of a fear that "the indulgence and attachments of the
people will keep a man in the chair after he becomes a dotard,
that re-election through life shall become habitual, and
election for life follow that."63 Moreover, Jefferson worried that
a continually elected President would become subject to foreign
influences, corruption and threats of force.64  Despite
Jefferson's arguments about the dangers of an entrenched
Chief Executive and trepidation about presidential service
59. See MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 43, at 90 ("Although Washington
did not intend that it do so, his voluntary retirement set a precedent for
limiting presidents to two terms that endured for nearly 150 years.").
60. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in
THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 140 (Edward Dumbauld ed.,
1955). Jefferson originally supported only a single (seven-year) presidential
term, but he was convinced by Washington's example that a person might
serve two terms without aggrandizing the powers of the Office. See MILKIS &
NELSON, supra note 43, at 90; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor
(Jan. 6, 1805), in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at
142.
61. SPANGLER, supra note 53, at 10.
62. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, in THE POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 60, at 142.
63. Id.
64. See BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 39, at 150.
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beyond two terms, his objection to open-ended reeligibility does
not appear to have been entirely inflexible. In 1805 Jefferson
stated "It]here is... one circumstance which could engage my
acquiescence in another election; to wit, such a division about a
successor, as might bring in a monarchist."65 Thus, we might
fairly conclude that even the most outspoken presidential
advocate for term limits recognized the necessity of deviating
from this general rule under extraordinary conditions.
3. Perceptions of Presidential Term Limits After Jefferson
Between Presidents Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, the
question of whether there should be a limit on the number of
terms a President could serve received little attention from
Presidents-although a number of Congressional measures
during this period attempted to address the issue.66 Jackson,
elected to the presidency in 1828 but still angered by the
"corrupt bargain" that denied him victory in the election four
years earlier, 67 called for sweeping changes in how the
President was elected and how long he could serve. In his first
message to Congress in 1829, and in subsequent public
statements,68 Jackson called for a direct vote for President and
for limiting the President to a single term of four or six years.
No measure supporting these changes was passed by Congress,
however.
Martin Van Buren was the only President between
Jackson and Lincoln to be renominated for a second term,
although he lost the second election and served only one term.
During Van Buren's administration, Congress passed ten
resolutions calling for a one-term limit on presidential
service-perhaps indicating, as Earl Spangler has argued,
65. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, in THE POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 60, at 142.
66. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
67. In the 1824 presidential election, Jackson received 99 electoral votes,
John Quincy Adams 84, and Henry Clay 37. Since no candidate received a
majority, the presidential selection was sent to the House where Clay threw
his votes to Adams, securing him the presidency. Jackson's supporters
asserted that a "corrupt bargain" was struck between Adams and Clay, a
charge that became more pointed when Adams named Clay as Secretary of
State. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF AMiERICAN HISTORY 228 (John
Mack Faragher ed., 4th ed. 1991).
68. At the beginning of each session of Congress for the next five years,
Jackson reiterated his interest in making Presidents ineligible for second
terms. See STATHIS, supra note 31, at 29.
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"some intra-party disaffection with him."69 In 1840, President-
elect William Henry Harrison pledged to serve only one term,
and in 1844, the Whigs included a one-term plank in their
national platform.70 While he was still a member of Congress,
James Buchanan (who became President in 1857) expressed
his support for "[the example of Washington, which has been
followed by Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe . . . that no
President shall be more than once re-elected." 71 While we have
found no discussion about whether Lincoln ever contemplated
a third term, Andrew Johnson called for a single presidential
term in a special message to Congress, shortly after assuming
office. In addition, during Johnson's administration, Congress
introduced twelve resolutions recommending single terms for
the President.7 2
The relative inattention the two-term issue received after
Jefferson ended with the presidency of Ulysses Grant. Not
long after Grant won reelection in 1872, a serious debate
percolated within Republican political circles about the
possibility of his running again in 1876. Although the
President himself remained reticent in public about the
subject,73 the prospect of an 1876 run met with increasing
attention and resistance, and in 1875 the Republican
conventions of a number of states passed resolutions declaring
their opposition to presidential service beyond two terms.74
Responding to the Pennsylvania convention's expression of
"unalterable opposition" to a third term run, Grant wrote a
letter to the convention president indicating that he was not,
69. SPANGLER, supra note 53, at 11.
70. See id.; see also Joseph E. Kallenbach, Constitutional Limitations on
Reeligibility of National and State Chief Executives, 46 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
442 (1952).
71. 10 CONG. DEB. 321 (1892) (statement of Rep. Buchanan), reprinted in
SMITH, supra note 50, at 8. Buchanan continued his remarks by arguing that
"W[this principle [that no President shall be reelected more than once] is [sic]
now become as sacred as if it were written in the Constitution." Id.
72. See Moves to Limit the Term, 1787-1947, 26 CONG. DIG. 14, 15 (1947)
(summarizing political initiatives to limit "the Presidential tenure of office"
from 1787 to 1947).
73. See SPANGLER, supra note 53, at 20; see generally id. at 17-25.
74. See id. at 21; see also 93 CONG. REC. 1953 (1947) (statement of Sen.
Lodge). The states were: Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
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nor had he "ever been, a candidate for a renomination."7 5
Grant further indicated that he "would not accept a
nomination if it were tendered unless it should come under
such circumstances as to make it an imperative
duty--circumstances not likely to arise."76 But in expanding on
this last point, Grant noted that there were no constitutional
prohibitions against serving more than two terms and that
under certain circumstances it might be wise to extend a
President's time in office beyond eight years.77 On December
15, 1875, however, the House passed a resolution indicating
that retirement from office after two terms was a "time-
honored custom" and that any departure from this tradition
was "unwise, unpatriotic, and fraught with peril to our free
institutions," and interest in a third term for Grant
temporarily disappeared.7 8
Although the prospect of a third term was a dead issue for
Grant at the end of 1875,79 by 1880 his candidacy was alive
again (with some convinced that the lapse of four years
between Grant's last service as President made him reeligible
for office).80 Indeed, as early as the summer of 1878, the
Illinois State Republican Convention endorsed Grant as its
candidate for an 1880 run.81 At the 1880 national Republican
convention, Grant led all other candidates through thirty-five
ballots, but on the thirty-sixth ballot anti-Grant forces
combined to nominate James A. Garfield.8 2 Despite this
outcome, and notwithstanding the examples of Washington
75. Stephen W. Stathis, The Twenty-Second Amendment: A Practical
Remedy or Partisan Maneuver?, 7 CONST. COIM. 61, 64 (1990) (quoting
Grant).
76. Id.
77. See Moves to Limit the Term, supra note 72, at 15 (noting that Grant
argued "that the Constitution did not restrict the Presidential term to two
terms, and that under certain circumstances it might be unfortunate to make
a change at the end of eight years").
78. CONG. GLOBE, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. 228 (1875) (quoting the resolution
proposed by Rep. Springer), reprinted in SMITH, supra note 50, at 9.
79. Grant's 1876 "bid" was officially terminated when the Republican
National Convention nominated Rutherford B. Hayes.
80. See 93 CONG. REc. 1953 (1947) (statement of Sen. Lodge). After the
election of 1876-which was again thrown to the House-President Hayes
"recommended a single six-year term . . . in his first inaugural address."
Moves to Limit the Term, supra note 72, at 15.
81. See SPANGLER, supra note 53, at 27-42 (discussing Grant and the
possibility of his being elected to a third term).
82. See Stathis, supra note 75, at 64; MORISON ET AL., supra note 28, at
413 (detailing the history of Grant's 1880 "candidacy").
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and Jefferson, the prospect of a President serving for at least
three terms was clearly very much alive in 1880.83
The issue continued to garner attention during the
presidency of Grover Cleveland, the only President to serve two
nonconsecutive terms. In 1884 Cleveland spoke out against
reeligibility while accepting the Democratic nomination.
Cleveland went on to win the general election of that year,
although he lost his reelection bid four years later.84 But in
1892, Cleveland was elected for a second time, and following
his victory, thirteen proposed constitutional amendments were
introduced in Congress seeking to limit the presidential term
in a variety of ways.8 5
At the beginning of the Progressive era, in an atmosphere
of political and democratic reform, the issue of whether there
were any limits on the duration of presidential service
reemerged.8 6 The Democratic platform of 1896 declared
it to be the unwritten law of this Republic, established by custom and
usage of a hundred years, and sanctioned by the example of the
greatest and wisest of those who founded and maintained our
Government, that no man should be eligible for a third term of the
Presidential office. 7
Shortly after his second inauguration in 1901, President
William McKinley was the subject of third term speculation-
speculation diminished after McKinley insisted he would not
83. Indeed, Spangler has speculated that if not for the 1880 Republican
Convention's rejection of the unit rule-awarding the entirety of a state
delegation's votes to the winner of a majority of the delegates-Grant would
have secured the nomination. See SPANGLER, supra note 53, at 39.
84. Cleveland won the popular vote for three elections in a row, but
during the second of these elections (in 1888) he lost the electoral college vote
to Benjamin Harrison. Cleveland received 48.6% of the popular vote compared
with Harrison's 47.8% but lost the electoral vote 168 to 233. See MILKIS &
NELSON, supra note 43, at 462.
85. See Moves to Limit the Term, supra note 72, at 16. According to
Congressional Research Service historian Stephen Stathis, Cleveland also
"did virtually nothing to discourage talk of a fourth nomination" in 1896,
although he was not ultimately selected by his party. STATHIS, supra note 31,
at 33.
86. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955);
GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963); Nancy Unger,
Progressivism (circa 1890s to 1917), in 2 POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 888-89 (L. Sandy Maisel ed., 1991).
87. Moves to Limit the Term, supra note 72, at 16 (providing an excerpt
from the Democratic platform).
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seek a third term and ultimately rendered moot by his
assassination on September 14, 1901.88
McKinley's successor, Vice President Theodore Roosevelt,
eventually raised serious questions about how long (and under
what conditions) a person might occupy the Office of President.
After serving as President-through-succession for three and a
half years, Roosevelt was elected to office in 1904. Shortly
after his victory, Roosevelt announced that he regarded his
service after McKinley's assassination as his first term, and, in
support of "[tihe wise custom which limits the President to two
terms," he would refuse any further nominations. "Under no
circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another
nomination," Roosevelt declared.89
But eight years later Roosevelt--convinced that his
successor, President William Taft, had drifted from (and even
betrayed) his foreign affairs and domestic policies 90-challenged
the incumbent for the Republican nomination. Explaining his
run for the presidency and reversal of his earlier position
(insisting that he would refuse further nominations), Roosevelt
argued that since 1904 was his first "election" his reelection in
1912 would not betray Washington's legacy.91  Between
February 26, 1912 when Roosevelt finally publicly indicated
that he would accept a presidential nomination, and June of
the same year, when the Republican Convention assembled,
the third term issue became a prominent part of the campaign.
Critics warned of Roosevelt's "inordinate ambition" and the
threat of dictatorship should he continue to serve, and the
Democratic platform of 1912 called for a single six-year term.92
Despite Roosevelt's challenge, Taft was renominated on
the first ballot, prompting Roosevelt to run as a third-party
Progressive candidate.93 Roosevelt's electoral hopes came to a
true end with his defeat in the general election, but concern
over the third term issue had already been fading since his
defeat at the Republican Convention. Nevertheless, a few
88. See SPANGLER, supra note 53, at 12 (discussing political speculation
surrounding McKinley).
89. SMITH, supra note 50, at 11-12 (quoting Theodore Roosevelt)
(citations omitted).
90. See MORISON ET AL., supra note 28, at 527 (describing Roosevelt's
growing misgivings about Taft).
91 See BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 39, at 157.
92. See SPANGLER, supra note 53, at 12.
93. See MORISON ETAL., supra note 28, at 527-28.
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weeks after the election Taft called for a six-year term
presidential limit with no possibility for reelection.94 And in
February 1913, the Senate passed a resolution 95 providing for
an amendment that also would have limited Presidents to a
single six-year term. The House did not act on the measure.
96
The only other President before FDR to be elected to a
second term was Woodrow Wilson. Before Wilson's health
problems (beginning with a stroke on September 25, 1920)
there is some evidence that he aspired to a third term. The
1912 Democratic platform on which Wilson ran included a
plank calling for a constitutional amendment "making the
President of the United States ineligible for reelection" and
pledging their candidate to this commitment,97 but Wilson
distanced himself from this pledge.98 After Wilson's second
election in 1916, there was speculation that a 1920 Wilson-
Roosevelt presidential battle would render the third term issue
unavoidable. 99 While Wilson was not nominated at the 1920
Democratic convention, he at no time declared himself
unwilling to serve or unfit for reelection.
Prior to FDR, Calvin Coolidge in 1927 made the last
presidential statement related to the question of how long a
President could serve. Coolidge, after serving part of Harding's
term and being elected once on his own, indicated that he did
not "choose" to run for President in 1928 (implying that he had
the option to do so).1°°
94. See SPANGLER, supra note 53, at 82.
95. See S.J. Res. 78, 62d Cong. (1913).
96. See Moves to Limit the Term, supra note 72, at 16 (describing the
outcome of the "Works' Resolution); cf. generally SPANGLER, supra note 53, at
83-92 (discussing the politics of presidential term limits around the period of
the Taft administration).
97. 93 CONG. REC. 1954 (1957) (citations omitted).
98. See KOENIG, supra note 43, at 64 (noting that Wilson "quickly
repudiated" the presidential term-limit plank of the Democratic platform).
99. See MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 43, at 304 (arguing that Wilson
"would have liked to serve another four years" but was too unpopular to be
renominated); SPANGLER, supra note 53, at 12.
100. See SPANGLER, supra note 53, at 13. Coolidge's suggestion that he
might have run for a third term may have prompted passage of the La
Follette Resolution discussed infra note 133. See SMITH, supra note 50, at 14
(arguing that "opposition of Democrats, Progressives and Independents" to
the "mere possibility" of Coolidge serving for a third term prompted passage
of the La Follette Resolution).
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C. TURNING FROM TRADITION?: FDR AND THE THIRD-TERM
QUESTION
As we have already seen, despite statements by scholars to
the contrary, the custom of a two-term limit on presidential
service appears to have been upheld somewhat contingently.
The examples of Grant and Theodore Roosevelt suggest that at
least two already "twice-elected" Presidents were prepared to
challenge the custom had their political fortunes unfolded
differently.101
We turn now to FDR, the only President who has served
for more than two full terms. We do this to understand the
immediate background of the debates and ratification
processes that led to the Twenty-Second Amendment, and to
see how the themes that surrounded the two-term issue in the
150 years prior to Roosevelt's third election played out in 1940
and thereafter.102
The third-term question was salient during the 1940
election.103 Although FDR stated in 1937 that his "great
ambition... [was to] turn over this desk and chair in the
White House" on Inauguration Day, interest in (and concern
over) extending the Roosevelt presidency persisted, and over
time the President's interest in running apparently grew
stronger, particularly as Germany extended the Second World
War into Western Europe and Scandinavia. 04 In September
101. Roosevelt was elected only once but served almost a full term after
McKinley's death and would have been treated as if "twice-elected" under the
terms of the Twenty-Second Amendment.
102. We do not offer any conclusions about whether the motivations
behind the adoption of the Twenty-Second Amendment were primarily
partisan or were bound up with a broader concern that an important
constitutional custom needed to be clarified and codified. In general, we do
not think it terribly realistic or feasible to separate entirely these different
motivations, and, at any rate, there is plausible evidence on both sides of the
issue. For an argument that the Twenty-Second Amendment was essentially
a partisan measure, see GRIMES, supra note 43, at 113-22. Stephen Stathis
also builds a strong case that the Amendment was passed by a coalition of
Republicans and southern Democrats opposed to Roosevelt's economic and
civil rights policies. See Stathis, supra note 75, at 68-72.
103. Speculation about a third term for FDR arose almost immediately
after his 1936 reelection, but FDR's early insistence that he would not run
and his later silence on the issue seem to have somewhat diffused attention
towards the issue prior to 1940. See generally SPANGLER, supra note 53, at
96-106.
104. See generally id. See also MILKIS AND NELSON, supra note 43, at 304.
Public opinion regarding a third-term run by Roosevelt appears to have
reached a critical turning point between the summers of 1936 and 1937.
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and October of 1940, a special subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee conducted sixteen days of hearings on
"the propriety of a third term."' 05 Campaign literature and
political pamphlets railed against the dangers of allowing a
President to serve as a would-be dictator and made thinly
veiled comparisons between Roosevelt and the Axis powers
leaders.106 Republican presidential candidate Wendell Wilkie,
responding to concerns about the issue of open-ended
presidential tenure, announced that if elected he would ask
Congress to make passage of a presidential term limit
amendment his first order of business.10 7 As the Democratic
National Convention opened in July 1940, FDR's continuing
reluctance to run openly made it unclear who would be the
Democratic nominee. Although Roosevelt indicated that all
delegates pledged to support him were free to choose whatever
candidate they desired, his message was interpreted to mean
he was willing to be drafted, and he subsequently was
renominated on the Convention's first ballot.108
In response to the nomination, between 1940 and 1943,
eight state legislatures passed resolutions calling for presidential
term limits.0 9 The Republican National Convention of 1940
sought a constitutional amendment to enforce a two-term limit
"to insure against the overthrow of our American system of
During this period a (narrow) majority of those polled went from being for a
"two term limit" to being against it, although between April 1943 and
December 1943, this position switched again. See Kallenbach, supra note 70,
at 450 n.43; see also infra note 111.
105. Stathis, supra note 75, at 65; KYVIG, supra note 43, at 325.
106. See KYVIG, supra note 43, at 327 (discussing the remarks of
Congressman Karl Mundt who warned that if Presidents continued to remain
in office for protracted periods "Americans might lose the freedom to vote
officials out of office, as had Germans under Hitler"). See generally
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON THE SUBJECT OF
LIMITATION OF TENURE OF OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
(Sept. 9, 1940) (statement of Jacob Gould Schurman) (arguing for a strict
limitation on the number of years a President could serve), reprinted in
THOMAS H. REED, THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE: A BRIEF AGAINST THE THIRD
TERM (1940).
107. See KYVIG, supra note 43, at 326.
108. See SPANGLER, supra note 53, at 120.
109. The states were New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island, which
passed their resolutions before the 1940 election, and Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Michigan, and Wisconsin, which passed their resolutions afterwards. See
Moves to Limit the Term, supra note 72, at 16.
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government." 10 Seven Gallup polls taken in 1943 and 1944
reported that between 45% and 62% of those surveyed favored
a constitutional amendment that would prohibit Presidents
from being elected more than twice, with support for such an
amendment increasing during that period."' Nevertheless,
Congress took no action on the question during Roosevelt's
presidency. FDR's victories in 1940 and 1944 were decisive
(although not as decisive as his previous elections), and in any
event interest in establishing a presidential term limit faded
after the attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent
involvement of the United States in the war.
FDR's elections to third and fourth terms both illuminate
and obfuscate our understanding of where the nation stood on
the question of presidential term limits at the time. On the
one hand, the elections of 1940 (with Roosevelt majorities in
thirty-eight states) and 1944 (majorities in thirty-six states)
might be understood as representing a national plebiscite on
the question of whether a President could serve more than two
terms. 12 At the same time, Roosevelt's third-term candidacy
energized his political opponents, who objected to his continued
service, and, as noted, polls indicate that the percentage of
those favoring a two-term limit on presidential service
110. KYVIG, supra note 43, at 326. The Republican platform of 1944 also
contained a plank for limiting the number of terms a President could serve.
See id.; Moves to Limit the Term, supra note 72, at 16. Wilkie promised to
promote the Convention's pledge immediately upon election.
111. Between April 29 and May 5, 1943, the Gallup polling organization
asked "Would you favor adding a law to the constitution to prevent any
President of the United States in the future from serving more than two
terms?" Responses were: Yes - 47%, No - 46%, and No Opinion - 7%. During
the same period Gallup asked a different group a slightly different question:
"Would you favor adding a law to the constitution which would prevent any
President of the United States from being reelected in the future if he has
already served two terms?" Responses were: Yes - 45%, No - 48%, and No
Opinion - 6%. This same question was asked four times during 1943 and
1944. The responses were: Yes - 45%, No - 49%, and No Opinion - 7% (May
1943); Yes - 50%, No - 43%, and No Opinion - 7% (November-December 1943);
Favor - 57%, Oppose - 43% (March 1944); and Yes - 54%, No - 41%, and No
Opinion - 5% (June 1944). Also during that same period, in June 1944, Gallup
asked: "Would you favor adding a law to the Constitution which would
prevent any President of the United States from being reelected after this
year's election if he has already served two terms?" Responses were: Yes -
62%, No - 32%, and No Opinion - 6%.
112. Of course, the electorate may have voted for Roosevelt out of
compelling expediency even while condemning or thinking unwise the
prospect of having a President serve for third and fourth terms.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
increased steadily between 1940 and 1945.113 In addition,
Roosevelt seems to have been cautious in confronting the third-
term issue in the 1940 election. According to Kyvig, he
engaged in "an elaborate charade of not running and only
accepting a Democratic draft" for President.'14 When Roosevelt
did address the issue of his continuing service, he remained
circumspect and stressed the extraordinary nature of the
times. In his last speech of the 1940 campaign, Roosevelt
somewhat obliquely justified a third term by explaining that:
[tihere is a great storm raging now, a storm that makes things
harder for the world. And that storm, which did not start in this land
of ours, is the true reason that I would like to stick by these people of
ours until we reach the clear, sure footing ahead."'
Whether or not there was a presidential custom limiting
service to two terms, Roosevelt's reelections in 1940 and 1944
demonstrated that it was not a custom deemed binding by
either him or the electorate. And when political interest in
limiting presidential tenure resurfaced following FDR's death
and the conclusion of the war, Roosevelt and his
unprecedented four terms of service became the common
referent for those arguing for (as well as against) setting a
constitutional limit. In the eyes of some, the case for limiting
presidential tenure was made vivid by perceived excesses of
the New Deal, FDR's aggressive attempts at power accretion
(like the Court-packing plan of 1937116 and his dramatic
reorganization of the executive branch" 7) and the overall
113. See Kallenbach, supra note 70, at 450 n.43.
114. KYVIG, supra note 43, at 325.
115. HERBERT S. PARMET & MARIE B. HECHT, NEVER AGAIN: A PRESIDENT
RUNS FOR A THIRD TERM 268 (1968) (quoting Franklin Delano Roosevelt).
Roosevelt's intimation-that the political crisis facing the nation should allow
him to continue his service-is not dissimilar from the statements made by
those who generally supported limited presidential service, including
Jefferson and Grant. See our discussion of these Presidents, supra notes 65
and 76 and accompanying text.
116. On Roosevelt's efforts to "pack the Court" with justices sympathetic to
his New Deal measures, see Mark E. Herrmann, Looking Down From the Hill:
Factors Determining the Success of Congressional Efforts to Reverse Supreme
Court Interpretations of the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543, 564-65
nn.126-27 (1992); see generally David E. Kyvig, The Road Not Taken: FDR, the
Supreme Court, and Constitutional Amendment, 104 POL. Sci. Q. 463 (1989).
117. On FDR's reorganization of the executive branch, see RICHARD
POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOsEvELT's GOVERNMENT (1966).
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growth of a powerful "modern" presidency.118 For those who
saw Roosevelt as a symbol of economic recovery, national
unity, and victory in the war against the Axis powers, FDR
served as the perfect argument for retaining open-ended
presidential service.
D. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO CODIFY THE Two-TERM
"TRADITION"
Continuing partisan opposition to the policies and politics
of FDR, coupled with the strong showing of Republicans in the
1946 Congressional elections, set the stage for legislative
action on presidential term limits. In the 1946 mid-term
election, Republicans achieved majorities in the House and
Senate for the first time since 1929, and they pushed forward a
presidential term limits amendment as one of their first orders
of business, as promised during the campaign.
As already indicated, this was hardly Congress's first
attempt to promote an amendment to limit presidential
eligibility. There is a lengthy history of efforts by both houses
of Congress to pass measures that would fix the terms of
service of Presidents, although, until the Twenty-Second
Amendment, not a single proposed amendment on the subject
was ever adopted by Congress and passed on to the states for
ratification.
1. Early Congressional Debates on Presidential Term Limits
Adoption of the Constitution did not put an end to the
debates over presidential term limits. Instead, for over a
118. Arguments along this general line developed during the congressional
debates over the Twenty-Second Amendment. As one Representative
contended, interest in the Twenty-Second Amendment grew
directly out of the unfortunate experience we had in this country in
1940 and again in 1944 when a President who had entrenched
himself in power by use of patronage and the public purse refused to
vacate the office at the conclusion of two terms, but used the great
powers of the Presidency to perpetuate himself in office.
93 CONG. REC. 857-58 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Karl Mundt). For an argument
that FDR's tenure and the New Deal ushered in the "modern" presidency, see
generally Fred I. Greenstein, Change and Continuity in the Modern
Presidency, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (Anthony King ed.,
1978); Fred I. Greenstein, Introduction: Toward a Modern Presidency, in
LEADERSHIP IN THE MODERN PRESIDENCY (Fred I. Greenstein ed., 1988). For
an argument that features of the "modern" presidency are not recent




century and a half after the Constitutional Convention,
members of Congress periodically attempted to limit the
number of terms a President could serve, suggesting that this
was a longstanding and persistent concern of the nation's
lawmakers. Indeed, between 1789 and 1947, 270 proposals to
limit the terms of office of the President were introduced in
Congress." 9
In 1803, following the contested election of 1800 (which
was thrown to the House of Representatives), Congress first
considered a proposal to limit presidential tenure to two
successive terms, and three terms overall.120 The measure was
soundly rejected. After that, there appears to have been little
congressional interest in the question until President Monroe
was nearing the end of his seventh year in office in 1823.
Although there is no evidence Monroe was considering another
run, political supporters of the various candidates hoping to
succeed the President pressed for a measure to codify the
"principle" limiting a President to two terms of service. 121 In
1824, the Senate passed a joint resolution providing that no
person should be chosen President for more than two terms. 122
Following another highly contested election in 1824 (when
Jackson lost even alter receiving a plurality of popular and
electoral college votes), a number of proposals to reform the
way in which Presidents were elected and the length of their
tenure in office were again considered. Among these was a
measure passed by the Senate in 1826 calling once again for a
two-term limit. 23 During Jackson's presidency, with the
119. See 93 CONG. REC. 847, 864 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Graham,
discussing the history of efforts to limit presidential reeligibility).
120. The resolution specified "that no person who has been twice
successively elected President shall be eligible as President until four years
elapse, when he may be eligible to office for four years and no longer." Moves
to Limit the Term, supra note 72, at 15.
Not surprisingly, each of the three times the presidential selection
process has been sent to the House of Representatives, calls to reform the
presidential selection process, including calls for limiting the number of times
a President could be elected, have followed.
121 See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE
GOVERNMENT 41 (1986).
122. See STATHIS, supra note 31, at 29.
123. Neither the 1824 nor the 1826 measure approved by the Senate was
supported by the House. See Moves to Limit the Term, supra note 72, at 15;
Stathis, supra note 75, at 63; SUNDQUIST, supra note 121, at 41 n.1. Kyvig
has mistakenly identified the 1824 and 1826 resolutions as House measures.
See KYVIG, supra note 43, at 326.
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President indicating his preference for a single term, Congress
considered twenty-one proposals seeking to alter the
Constitution's provisions regarding presidential service.
However, none of these measures were passed by both
houses. 124
The absence of a serious prospect for a third-term
challenge seems to have resulted in limited congressional
activity on the presidential term limit issue for the next forty
years.1 25 But in December 1875, responding to the possibility
of a third-term run by President Grant,126 the House passed, by
a 234 to 18 vote, the "Springer resolution" stating that:
the precedent established by Washington and other Presidents of the
United States in retiring from the Presidential office after their
second term has become, by universal concurrence, a part of our
republican system of government, and that any departure from this
time-honored custom would be unwise, unpatriotic and fraught with
peril to our free institutions. 127
As indicated in our previous discussion, at the time the
Springer resolution was passed, Grant presented a credible
threat to the two-term tradition. But after encountering
political resistance to the idea of his running for a third term,
he ultimately refused to be a candidate in 1876, although he
was an unsuccessful candidate for the Republican nomination
in 1880.
The longstanding political movement to limit presidential
terms appears to have gained some strength after 1900, when
the number of relevant legislative proposals increased. 128 In
1912 alone, twenty-one amendments were introduced in
124. See SPANGLER, supra note 53, at 10.
125. In 1841, the legislatures of Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont approved resolutions supporting a
single presidential term. See STATHIS, supra note 31, at 29.
126. See our discussion of Grant, supra text accompanying notes 73-83.
127. Moves to Limit the Term, supra note 72, at 15. The measure was
introduced by Representative William M. Springer. See id. Kyvig has
mistakenly identified the 1875 amendment as an initiative of the Senate. See
KYVIG, supra note 43, at 326.
128. See Moves to Limit the Term, supra note 72, at 16. From 1789 to 1889
Congress passed an average of 1.25 term-limit proposals per session (125
total) and from 1890 to 1946 an average of 1.79 term-limit proposals per
session (100 total), including one proposal to limit the term to 5 years, 79 to
limit it to 6 years, 3 to limit it to 7 years, 3 to limit it to 8 years and 14 to limit
it to two terms of 4 years.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Congress "proposing a limitation on the Presidential term."'129
Prior to Wilson's first inauguration in 1913, the Senate passed
a resolution limiting the President to a single six-year term by
a two-thirds margin, but the House did not act on the
measure.130
In the 1920s, Congress once again introduced numerous
resolutions that sought to limit presidential service, with early
1927 a particularly active period. During this time,
Representative Fairchild called for an amendment to the
Constitution specifying that:
[n]o person shall be eligible to the office of President who has
previously served two terms, whether by election or by succession
due to the removal, death, resignation, or inability of the President
where the term by succession shall have continued for a period of 2
years or more. 131
Representative Beck introduced a measure almost identical to
the House resolution of 1875 (recognizing the "time-honored"
tradition of retiring after two terms of service).132 A few weeks
later, Senator Robert La Follette, Jr., son of the Progressive
presidential candidate, introduced a resolution in the Senate
limiting the President to two terms. In January 1928, Senator
La Follette's resolution was reintroduced, amended and passed
by the Senate in a form that was again nearly identical to the
1875 House measure. 133 This was the last time Congress
considered legislation on presidential eligibility before FDR
became a candidate for a third term in 1940. With FDR's
candidacy the movement for term limitations was briefly
renewed, but it flagged after FDR's death, gaining sufficient
political energy only after Republicans subsequently took over
the 80th Congress.
On the whole, a review of congressional efforts to enact
presidential term limits suggests that while concerns about the
question of reeligibility were expressed quite steadily, these
concerns were not addressed through any systematic campaign
to limit presidential reeligibility. Although members of
Congress had frequently fretted about the threat of Presidents
129. See 93 CONG. REc. 1954 (1947) (excerpt from the Congressional




132. See Moves to Limit the Term, supra note 72, at 16.
133. See S. Res. 128, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928); see also GRIMES, supra
note 43, at 114-15; Stathis, supra note 75, at 62-64.
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entrenching their power through indefinite tenure in office, 134
the legislative responses to this perceived threat were
substantively varied, somewhat fitfully pursued, and, until
1947, unsuccessful.
2. Proposal and Ratification of the Twenty-Second
Amendment
Despite some loss of interest in the question of presidential
term limits after Roosevelt's 1940 election and the eventual
involvement of the United States in World War II, the issue
resurfaced not long after the death of FDR and the end of the
war. The strong showing of Republicans in the 1946
elections-and their resulting possession of majorities in the
House and Senate for the first time in eighteen years-enabled
them to advance a term limit amendment.
On January 3, 1947, the first day of the first session of the
80th Congress, House Judiciary Chairman Earl C. Michener
and Speaker of the House Joseph Martin introduced a
presidential term limit amendment, House Joint Resolution 27
(H.J. Res. 27),135 which was referred to the House Judiciary
Committee. 136 H.J. Res. 27, as originally written, specified that:
[n]o person shall be chosen or serve as President of the United States
for any term, or be eligible to hold the office of President during any
term, if such person shall have heretofore served as President during
the whole or any part of each of any two separate terms.137
The proposal was modified by the House Judiciary
Committee, which reported H.J. Res. 27 to the full House on
February 5 with the following revision (replacing the language
above):
134. For a representative account of these concerns, see 93 CONG. REC. 852
(1947) (remarks of Rep. Jennings):
Without such a limit on the number of terms a man may serve in the
Presidency, the time may come when a man of vaulting ambition
becomes President. Such a man, clothed with the vast powers of the
Presidency and backed by a subservient Congress, as Commander in
Chief of our Army and Navy, could well have in his hands the two
mightiest instrumentalities of governmental power, the sword and
the purse.
135. Generally speaking, joint resolutions deal with legislative matters of
an unusual nature (such as proposed constitutional amendments) while
concurrent resolutions address issues of organization, procedure, and opinion
relevant to both houses and issues of concern to a single chamber. See
RIcHARD A. WATSON, PRESIDENTIAL VETOES AND PUBLIc POLICY 20 (1993).
136. See 93 CONG. REC. 47-48 (1947).
137. Id. at 849 (emphasis added).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Any person who has served as President of the United States during
all, or portions, of any two terms, shall thereafter be ineligible to hold
the office of President.'
The House Judiciary Committee's language does not appear to
have altered the original measure's substance: under each
proposal, regardless of whether a President was elected or
assumed the Office through some other means, his or her
service was limited to a maximum of two terms. 139
On February 6, H.J. Res. 27 was brought to the floor under
a rule allowing two hours of debate, which Democratic
opponents of the measure decried as inappropriately restrictive
for a proposed amendment to the Constitution.140 Along with
forty-seven Democrats (thirty-seven of whom were from the
South) voting for the proposal, all 238 Republicans present
supported the measure, leading some commentators to argue
that the Amendment was propelled by partisan concerns and
regional interests.141
The Senate received H.J. Res. 27, as revised and approved
by the House, on February 7 and referred the measure to its
Judiciary Committee. The Senate Judiciary Committee
modified the language still further to provide that:
A person who has held the office of President, or acted as President,
on three hundred and sixty-five calendar days or more in each of two
terms shall not be eligible to hold the office of President, or to act as
President, for any part of another term.42
Like the original House resolution, the Senate Judiciary
Committee's language addressed presidential service generally,
rather than limiting itself, as the Twenty-Second Amendment
ultimately would, to presidential reelection.
During the early part of March 1947, the Judiciary
Committee debated this resolution on the Senate floor,
138. H.R. REP. No. 80-17, at 1 (1947) (emphasis added).
139. The Committee Report contains no discussion about why the
Committee amended the original language of H.J. Res. 27.
140. See KYVIG, supra note 43, at 327.
14L See 93 CONG. REC. 872 (1947) (listing the results of voting for H.J.
Res. 27). Koenig describes the Twenty-Second Amendment as resulting from
"a mixture of political motivations, partisan and personal" and as
"posthumous revenge against Franklin Roosevelt." KOENIG, supra note 43, at
66. For background on the changing partisan alignments that help to explain
the coalition that supported the Twenty-Second Amendment, see generally
WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF
AMERICAN POLITICS (1970) and JAMES L. SUNDQuisT, DYNAMICS OF THE
PARTY SYsTEM (1983).
142. S. REP. No. 80-34, at 1 (1947) (emphasis added).
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rejecting a proposal to amend it further to enforce a single six-
year presidential term.143 Then, on March 10, the Senate
considered an amendment offered by Democratic Senator
Warren Magnuson that would have replaced the Judiciary
Committee's language with the seemingly more straight-
forward provision that [n1o person shall be elected to the office
of President more than twice."'" Magnuson explained that the
language in his proposal, unlike the "complicated legal
language"'145 of the Committee version, "could be easily
understood by everyone, and... would not involve complicated
legal questions," such as "When is a man Acting President?
When does he assume the office" and, "to what period he
should be limited" when "elevated to the office of President
through circumstances beyond his control"? 146  Magnuson
argued that his proposal would bypass these questions by
focusing on what was "really intended to be reached"-
preventing a President from "perpetuat[ing] himself in
office." 147 Finally, Magnuson suggested that the Judiciary
Committee version of the resolution would unduly restrict a
person elevated to the Office of President "through
circumstances beyond his control, and with no deliberation on
his part ... but because of an emergency or an unfortunate
circumstance," from subsequently running for office. 148
Although Magnuson acknowledged that his proposal did not
account for the possibility that someone might serve or act as
President without being elected, he discounted these
contingencies as beyond the immediate focus of the 80th
Congress and its concern with limiting the number of times a
person could be elected.
A number of Magnuson's colleagues echoed his position on
H.J. Res. 27. Senator Joseph Tydings, one of the authors of the
143. The proposal, which would have fixed the maximum tenure of all
elected federal officials at six years, was defeated 82-1 on March 7. See 93
CONG. REC. 1794 (1947).
144. Id. at 1863 (remarks of Sen. Magnuson).
145. Id. Magnuson later explained that the "only purpose [of his
amendment] is to make it simple so that the people of the United States will
know what they are voting on when it is presented to the States." Id. at 1865.
146. Id. at 1863. Although Magnuson indicated that there was extensive
discussion in the Judiciary Committee about how the term limit proposal
would affect an acting President, the precise content of this discussion is only
alluded to in the Committee report. See S. REP. No. 80-34, supra note 142.




version of the resolution that would eventually become the
Twenty-Second Amendment, spoke in favor of Magnuson's
Amendment:
What we are trying to do is to stop any man from being elected
President more than twice .... But under the committee amendment
a man could be prohibited from being elected President more than
once, provided that he had served more than 1 year prior to the time he
was elected President .... I think that provision is a little stringent.14
Like Magnuson, Tydings emphasized the restrictive
nature of the Senate Judiciary Committee's language,
especially in limiting persons elevated to the presidency
without seeking election to that Office. As Tydings explained:
If it is right to have a limitation of 8 years for a twice-elected
President, then why in heaven's name is it not right to give a Vice
President the 3 years which he may serve in the term of his
predecessor plus one full term, rather than limit him to 5 years
[which the committee amendment would doltO
A number of Senators were unswayed by the arguments of
Tydings and Magnuson and thought it important to consider
the very issues Magnuson's proposal did not directly address,
including, for example, questions about how the amendment
affected persons elevated to the office through non-electoral
means.151 Senator Bourke Hickenlooper spoke out against the
Magnuson amendment, explaining that it would create a
"peculiar situation" whereby "an individual who becomes
President by accident, an act of divine providence, or
otherwise, and who was not originally elected to the position, is
the only person who can hold protracted office in the
Presidency" (by still being eligible for election and
reelection).152 Magnuson conceded that this was a fair reading
of his proposal but did not think the amendment should be so
149. Id. (remarks of Sen. Tydings).
150. Id. at 1865. The five years refers to the limit on presidential service
(under the Senate Committee proposal) for an individual "accidentally" placed
in the presidency for a year, who then desired to run for office. See id. at 1863
(remarks of Sen. Lucas). It is not entirely clear what proposal Tydings
favored; he did indicate at one point that he wished to "see the Presidency
limited to two terms," although it is not obvious how this (vague) formulation
would necessarily address his concerns about limiting the electoral options of
those propelled into the presidency through non-electoral means.
151. Indeed, many of the very questions that Magnuson suggested were
beyond the immediate purposes of the Amendment seem to have preoccupied
the Judiciary Committee. See S. REP. No. 80-34 (1947); 93 CONG. REC. 1863
(1947).
152. 93 CONG. REC. 1864 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Hickenlooper) (emphasis
added).
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detailed that it would "deal with contingencies whereby a man
because of circumstances beyond his control is elevated to a
high office." 153 Other Senators expressed concerns about how
long an individual could serve as President under Magnuson's
proposal. Senator Robert Taft objected to Magnuson's
amendment, pointing out that a person who was elevated to
the Office of President through non-electoral means might still
be elected twice and serve "as long as 11 1/2 years... [which]
is too long."154 Perhaps sensing that he did not have sufficient
support for his amendment, Senator Magnuson modified his
version of H.J. Res. 27 to prohibit successive elections, but still
found his amendment soundly rejected on the Senate floor.155
On March 12, Senator Taft sought a compromise between
supporters of Magnuson's amendment and those still troubled
by its inattention to those who might assume the presidency
without being elected to that Office. Taft's amendment drew
on the "election" language of Magnuson's amendment and
avoided the controversy of the Committee amendment, which
was seen as unduly restricting the reeligibility of those called
on to act as or become President through no doing of their
own.156 Specifically, Taft's amendment provided that:
No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than
twice, and no person who has held the office of President or acted as
President for more than 2 years of a term to which some other person
was elected President, shall be elected to the office of the President
more than once.1'7
153. Id. (remarks of Sen. Magnuson).
154 Id. (remarks of Sen. Taft). It is not entirely clear how Taft came up
with the figure of 11 1/2 years although it appears to have been merely an
example of how long someone might serve (as opposed to a perceived absolute
limit of service) under Magnuson's amendment. Taft and his colleagues do
not seem to be wholly consistent in interpreting the Magnuson amendment on
this point. Despite his references to 11 12 years, Taft suggests at one point
that eleven years was the "extreme" for the amendment, and at still another
point argued that the amendment "might permit a man to serve 12 years if
the President should die between the date of the election and the date of his
inauguration." Id. at 1938.
Our analysis is consistent with this last interpretation. It appears that
the Magnuson amendment would have allowed a Vice President to serve as
acting President for what would be essentially a full term (minus only
however long the President served) in addition to two full terms as elected
President.
155. See id. at 1944-45.
156. See id. at 1938.




The Taft amendment was intended to balance the concerns
of those (like Senator Tydings) who thought that the "five-year"
limit provided by the Committee Amendment was too short
and those who thought the "11 1/2 year limit" of Magnuson's
amendment was too lengthy. Taft believed his amendment
was "clearer" than the Committee's amendment, although he
did not explain how this was so (and there are good reasons to
believe Magnuson's and Tafts language left many issues
unclear). 58
The compromise Taft worked out with Tydings and others
would eventually rule the day, becoming the language of what
we now know as the Twenty-Second Amendment. No Senate
Republican voted against the Taft proposal (just as no House
Republican had voted against H.J. Res. 27), and a substantial
bloc of southern Democrats also voted for the measure,
ensuring relatively comfortable passage by a fifty-nine to
twenty-three vote. 159 The next day, March 13, the Senate
returned the measure to the House. After several days of
debate, on March 21 the House adopted the Taft version of the
proposed amendment by the constitutionally required two-
thirds margin and sent it to the states for ratification.16°
Within two months of its introduction in the House, the
Twenty-Second Amendment had been presented to the states.
Between the filing of the amendment with the Secretary of
State on March 24, and the end of the year, eighteen state
legislatures ratified the measure. "Republican-dominated" and
158. See id. (remarks of Sen. Taft) (i believe that the language of the
suggested amendment is somewhat clearer than the language of the
committee amendment.").
159. See 93 CONG. REC. 1978, 2389 (1947). Article Five of the Constitution
only specifies that "two thirds of both Houses" are required to propose
amendments. One might read this as requiring proposals by two-thirds of the
total membership of each house (a requirement that would invalidate many
current amendments to the Constitution, including the Twenty-Second). Yet
in 1920 the Supreme Court ruled that the two-thirds requirement referred to
a quorum rather than full congressional membership. See The National
Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920); see also JOHN R. VILE,
CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING
PROCESS 8 (1993). Since those voting numbered eighty-two, the measure
required fifty-five votes for two-thirds passage.
160. 93 CONG. REC. 2392 (1947). While the margin of votes met the
constitutional two-thirds requirement, the actual number of voters was
considerably less than the full House. (The final vote in the House was 81-
29.) As Everett Brown notes, "[olbjection to the vote on the ground[s] of
absence of a quorum was made and then withdrawn." Everett Brown, The
Term of Office of the President, 41 AM. POL. SC. REV. 447, 447 (1947).
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southern legislatures tended to pass the measure in relatively
short order, but ratification proceeded very slowly after this
first wave of support, and it was not until 1951 that the
required two-thirds of the states approved the proposed
amendment. 161
During the ratification process only twenty-five
Republican state senators and fifty-eight Republican state
representatives, out of 3,272 Republican legislators whose
votes were recorded, opposed the Twenty-Second
Amendment. 162 As James Davis explains, the Twenty-Second
Amendment was ratified because of the determination of
Republicans (and southerners) "not to see a repeat
performance of four successive presidential victories by
another FDR-type candidate. 163
3. Assessing the Congressional Debates
Having examined the immediate context in which the
Twenty-Second Amendment was proposed, considered and
ratified, we move on to a preliminary assessment of the
congressional debates on the Amendment. Specifically, we
seek to answer two questions. First, do the debates reveal the
purpose of the Amendment as it was perceived at the time?
Second, how is one to explain the shift from the language
approved by the House, and even that supported by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, to what was eventually endorsed by both
houses of Congress and ratified by the states?
The congressional debates on the Twenty-Second
Amendment revolved around three broad concerns relevant to
our analysis: (1) the sorts of contingencies the Amendment
should address; (2) the effect on presidential (re)eligibility of
having previously acted as or become President without being
elected; and (3) particular sensibilities about absolute limits on
the number of years someone could serve as President under
the Amendment.
161. See KYVIG, supra note 43, at 331; see also NELSON AND MILKIs, supra
note 43, at 305 (describing the ratification process). The four years it took to
ratify the Twenty-Second Amendment was longer than it took to ratify any
other amendment except for the Twenty-Seventh, whose constitutional
standing has been the subject of debate because of the 203 years required for
its ratification. See Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment 200 Years Too Late?, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 501 (1994).
162. See Stathis, supra note 75, at 70.
163. JAMES W. DAviS, THE AMEaIcAN PREsmENcY 406 (1995).
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Although these issues received considerable attention on
the floors of the House and Senate, our review of the
congressional debates suggests that the text of the Amendment
was probably shaped most decisively by the impulse for
compromise. The shift from the House's references to
presidential "service" and "tenure" to the Senate's eventual
reliance on simply limiting presidential "election" appears
largely to have been a function of political give-and-take. Taft,
in fact, acknowledged that his amendment was intended to
balance the concerns of proponents and critics of Magnuson's
proposal. Similarly, when the House considered the Senate-
endorsed version of the eventual Twenty-Second Amendment,
although some House members found the measure "pregnant
with questions" and indicated that they preferred the original
House language, they recognized the need for "compromise" as
part of the legislative process. 164
This willingness to compromise may have contributed to
the imprecision that characterized the language used by
members of Congress as they considered H.J. Res. 27 and its
various formulations. Members of both the House and Senate,
for example, often vaguely suggested that they were
attempting to limit presidential "tenure" without elaborating
exactly what they had in mind or using the term consistently.
And, as we have seen, those debating the Amendment at times
appeared to conflate the notion of "election" with the other
ways in which a President might come to serve, but at other
moments they clearly distinguished elections from non-
electoral means of assuming the Office of President.
Furthermore, congressional interest in not "penalizing"
those unelected but nonetheless called upon to serve or act as
President led Congress to focus on "elections" as the
cornerstone of the Amendment's proscriptions-a focus that
prohibited only reelection of an already twice-elected President.
In prohibiting "reelection" only, Congress seemingly glossed
over the significance of limiting subsequent election rather
than subsequent "service," and unwittingly (we presume) left
open the possibility of a previously twice-elected President
reassuming Office to again serve (or act) as President.
In view of these observations, it is difficult to divine
precisely what those adopting the Amendment meant for it to
foreclose and permit. Neither the general content of Congress's
164. See 93 CONG. REC. 2390 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Michener).
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deliberations nor the precise words they selected for the
various amendments they considered provide clear guidance on
this question. The evidence does suggest, however, that most
members of Congress--or at least most of those who discussed
the Amendment-thought that it was designed to prevent an
individual from becoming entrenched in the presidency, even if
supported by the electorate.1 65 Yet it remains difficult to say
much more about Congress's intentions, and this general
sentiment alone may not provide adequate guidance when
evaluating the constitutionality of the six scenarios, an
assessment we take up in Part I.
E. THE TWENTY-SECOND AMENDMENT SINCE ENACTMENT
Before proceeding to Part III, we conclude our historical
evaluation of the Twenty-Second Amendment by examining
how the Amendment has been assessed and interpreted in the
years following ratification. This review is organized around
four periods: the first three are marked by the presidencies of
Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan, and the last extends from the
end of Reagan's presidency to the present.1 66 We organize our
analysis in this way because the first three individuals
reelected to the presidency following ratification of the Twenty-
Second Amendment have drawn attention to (and prompted
criticism of) the Amendment.1 67 At a number of points both
Eisenhower and Reagan spoke out against the Amendment,
and an effort to repeal it developed following Nixon's
reelection-and died rapidly after the revelations of Watergate.
We review the period after Reagan to illustrate contemporary
evaluations of the Twenty-Second Amendment, and to suggest
165. As Senator Revercomb explained, "I believe there should be a definite
and fixed time beyond which no man, whoever he may be, now or in the
future, through the life of the Nation, may hold the office of President." Id. at
1946 (remarks of Sen. Revercomb).
166. One of the ironic developments of the Twenty-Second Amendment is
that a measure initiated and passed in large measure by Republican efforts
has formally constrained three Republican Presidents (Eisenhower, Nixon,
and Reagan) and only one Democrat (Clinton).
167. To the best of our knowledge, no serious repeal effort has been
proposed since Clinton's 1996 reelection. Clinton himself has not weighed in
on the issue, although he has said about running for a third term: "I'd do it
again... if I could." See Nancy Mathis & Alan Bernstein, Clinton Gives City
the Old College Try; President Emphasizes Education, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,




that concern with the Amendment remains very much alive as
we near the turn of the century.
1. The Eisenhower Years
Only five years after ratification of the Twenty-Second
Amendment, President Eisenhower, on the verge of an
overwhelming reelection, publicly questioned the Amendment's
wisdom. One month before the 1956 election he told reporters
that the electorate "ought to be able to choose for its President
anybody that it wants, regardless of the number of terms he
has served," and explained that the Amendment may not be
"wholly wise."168
In 1956 two resolutions were introduced in the House to
repeal the Twenty-Second Amendment.169 And after the new
Congress convened in January 1957, five resolutions were
introduced to repeal the Amendment. 170 Senator Richard
Neuberger indicated that the intent of at least one of the
proposals was to give "to the American people the right to
continue Dwight Eisenhower in office." 171  Eisenhower
responded to these initiatives by indicating that he would not
seek a third term even if the Amendment was repealed,17 2 but
the issue of presidential reeligibility continued to receive
political attention.173
In 1959, the House and Senate held hearings on the
Twenty-Second Amendment, and former President Truman 74
168. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President's News Conference of October 5,
1956, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1956,
at 860 (David C. Eberhart ed., 1958). Despite this early public support for
reeligibility, Louis Koenig suggests that "both before and after assuming
office" Eisenhower was intrigued with the idea of serving a single term and
then ceding the Office to someone younger. "Eisenhower came within an
eyelash of incorporating this proposal into his first inaugural address... [but
alt the last minute he was talked out of it." KOENIG, supra note 43, at 64.
169. See STATHIS, supra note 31, at 44.
170. See Stathis, supra note 75, at 73.
171. 103 CONG. REC. 825 (1957) (remarks of Sen. Richard Neuberger).
172. See President Bars a 3rd-Term Race Even If 'They Repeal' Ban on It,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1957, at 14.
173. Representative Stewart Udall, with the assistance of the American
Historical Association and the American Political Science Association,
surveyed over thirty leading historians and political scientists on the question
of repealing the Twenty-Second Amendment and reported the results to
Congress. Twenty-four of the twenty-nine who responded favored immediate
repeal. See 103 CONG. REC. 843 (1957).
174. Truman was exempted from the reach of the Amendment, which
specified that it "shall not apply to any person holding the office of President
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appeared before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments to criticize the Amendment and
urge its repeal. 175 The Amendment, according to Truman, was
unwisely passed by "Roosevelt haters" and made a "'lame duck'
out of every second term President for all time in the future."176
The Twenty-Second Amendment, Truman added, put a
President "in the hardest job in the world... with one hand
tied behind his back."177 Some members of the Subcommittee
expressed sympathy with the repeal position, and the
Subcommittee approved a repeal resolution in September of
1959. But after Eisenhower backed away from his earlier
criticism of the Amendment (calling for "careful thought" on
the question of repeal, and continued experimentation to see
how it functioned), 78 the repeal movement lost momentum.179
As the election of 1960 neared, however, attention again
turned to the Twenty-Second Amendment. In a press
conference on January 13, Eisenhower invited reporters to look
into the question of whether he would be eligible to run as a
vice presidential candidate under the terms of the Twenty-
Second Amendment.8 0 As Eisenhower put it, "the only thing I
know about the Presidency the next time is this: I can't run.
when this Article was proposed by the Congress." U.S. CONST. amend. XXII,
§ 1.
175. Truman apparently retreated from an earlier position approving
limits on presidential service, reflected in his statement: "When we forget the
example of such men as Washington, Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, all of
whom could have had a continuation in the office, then we will start down the
road to dictatorship and ruin." 2 HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS: YEARS OF
TRIAL AND HOPE 488-89 (1956). In a 1952 press conference, Truman also
indicated that "eight years were enough for any man to demonstrate what he
could do for the welfare of the nation."
176. KYVIG, supra note 43, at 334 (quoting SUBCOlMnITTEE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY ON REPEAL OF THE 22ND AMENDMENT (May 4, 1959) (statement of
Harry S. Truman)).
177. Paul B. Davis, The Results and Implications of the Enactment of the
Twenty-Second Amendment, 9 PRES. STUD. Q. 289, 290 (1979) (quoting Harry
S. Truman).
178. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President's News Conference of May 13,
1959, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1959,
at 387 (David C. Eberhart ed., 1960). It is not clear why Eisenhower changed
his position about the wisdom of the Twenty-Second Amendment. Kyvig
suggests that "Eisenhower, reflexively at odds with his predecessor" recanted
his position simply to be contrary to Truman. KYVIG, supra note 43, at 335.
179. See KYVIG, supra note 43, at 334-35; Stathis, supra note 75, at 73.




[Laughter] But someone has raised the question that were I
invited, could I constitutionally run for Vice President, and you
might find out about that one. I don't know. [Laughter]"lB'
The question appears to have been raised somewhat in
jest,8 2 particularly since, according to the New York Times,
when the issue "had arisen in White House inner circles" it
was quickly rejected based on the belief that if Eisenhower
were serving as Vice President and events called for
presidential succession, he would be bypassed as a successor
(because of the terms of the Twenty-Second Amendment), and
the presidency would automatically go to the Speaker of the
House 83 under the terms of the 1947 Succession Act. 84 Since
the Speaker might very well be a Democrat, this chain of
events was deemed undesirable.
At a press conference two weeks after Eisenhower first
raised the possibility of his serving as Vice President, he was
18L Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President's News Conference of January
13, 1960, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
1960-1961, at 23 (Warren R. Reid ed., 1961). Eisenhower's comments
prompted some scholarly and political commentary on the issue. Former
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, for example, said that the prospect of
Eisenhower running as Vice President was "more unlikely than
unconstitutional," and Senator Hennings of Missouri concluded that
Eisenhower could not only run for Vice President, but could "also inherit the
Presidency." George Dixon, Ike's Right to V.P. Spot, WASH. POST, Jan. 21,
1960, at A23. It is unclear if Louis Koenig was referring to these or other
commentators when he noted that "[a] dmirers of former President
Eisenhower . . . concluded after reading . . . [the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment's] text that he could well be restored as chief executive by the route of
succession after first being elected as Vice President." KOENIG, supra note 43,
at 65.
182. This view is supported by the laughter at the press conference and by
what the New York Times reported was a "highly qualified source" who
explained "the President was having some fun because in his case the
situation could never arise." Nixon is His Choice, President Indicates, supra
note 180, at 17. Stephen Stathis has also supported this view. See Stathis,
supra note 75, at 76 (stating that "in jest [Eisenhower] raised the intriguing
possibility that he just might run for vice president."); see also Telephone
Interview by Bruce G. Peabody with Stephen W. Stathis, Senior Specialist in
American National Government and Public Administration with the
Government Division of the Congressional Research Service (June 24, 1997).
(During the interview, Stathis speculated that Eisenhower's remarks about
running as Vice President was part of the President's efforts to get reporters
to "chase their own tails.")
183. Nixon is His Choice, President Indicates, supra note 180, at 17. The
fact that the question was debated within the President's "inner circles"
suggests that the matter may not have been taken lightly, at least
preliminarily.
184. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1994).
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asked whether he had received an "official opinion" on the
question. Eisenhower was somewhat circumspect but he did
say that
the afternoon of that [first] press conference, there was a note on my
desk saying a report from the Justice Department-I don't know
whether the Attorney General himself signed this,"" but the report
was, it was absolutely legal for me to do so. That stopped it right
there, as far as I'm concerned.'1
The prospect of a Vice President Eisenhower was raised
again briefly when the Republican National Convention
convened in July. On July 21, 1960, at the Convention,
Representative James Fulton announced that he would
nominate Eisenhower to be Vice President alongside Richard
Nixon,187 but Fulton's proposal seems to have generated little
attention or political support.
While Eisenhower ultimately backed away from the idea
that he might run as Vice President, there is some evidence that,
despite the constraints of the Twenty-Second Amendment, he
did not completely relinquish his presidential ambitions at the
end of his second term. Only four months after Kennedy's
inauguration in May 1961, Eisenhower indicated that he would
185. President Eisenhower's Attorney General at the time was William P.
Rogers. We wrote him about the report referenced by Eisenhower, asking for
his recollections about counseling "whether President Eisenhower could have,
or should have (from a constitutional standpoint) run as Vice-President after
having already twice been elected, and having served two terms as President."
He responded, in writing, saying:
I have no recollection of any report and doubt that I made such a report
either in writing or orally. The idea that President Eisenhower might
want to run for Vice-President under those circumstances is so
outrageous that I cannot imagine ever having given attention to the
subject.
Letter from William P. Rogers to Theresa Ferrero (for Scott E. Gant) (Nov. 12,
1997) (on file with authors). Rogers's account, however, contradicts a New
York Times report that "Vice President Nixon said . .. Attorney General,
William P. Rogers had studied the problem [of whether Eisenhower might run
as Vice President]. Mr. Rogers, he said, informed him that under the
Constitution the President could run for the Vice-Presidency if he wanted to."
Nixon and Eisenhower? Well, G.O.P. Can Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1960, at
26.
186. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President's News Conference of January
26, 1960, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
1960-1961, supra note 181, at 133. We have been unable to find any
references by Eisenhower to the Justice Department report or the prospect of
his running as Vice President in the period between the first and second press
conferences, or after the latter press conference.
187. See Vote for Eisenhower: Delegate Says He'll Propose Him for Vice-
Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1960, at 8.
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have considered running for a third term if he had not been
constitutionally barred from doing so and he had been able to
foresee Nixon's defeat in the 1960 election. 188 Eisenhower's
son, John, also indicated that he and White House officials
believed that had Eisenhower not been barred from running
for reelection, he probably would have done so in 1960.189 And
some political commentators have speculated that if
Eisenhower had run, he would have been renominated and
reelected. 190
2. The Nixon Years
Between Eisenhower and Nixon the Twenty-Second
Amendment generated little political interest. Despite this
relative inattention to the Amendment, some members of
Congress called for its repeal. Joint resolutions to do away
with the Amendment were introduced in the Eighty-Seventh,
Eighty-Eighth and Eighty-Ninth Congresses (between 1961-
1966), although none of these measures received a great deal of
political support.1 91 Moreover, the two Presidents between
Eisenhower and Nixon each offered views on the Amendment.
John F. Kennedy supported the Amendment. Having voted for
it as a member of Congress in 1947, he was asked during an
interview at the end of 1962 whether he still supported the
Amendment. Kennedy responded by explaining: "[eight] years
is enough, and I am not sure that a President, in my case if I
188. See Eisenhower Says He'll Speak Out on Issues Confronting the
Nation, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1961, at 1 ("General Eisenhower also disclose[d]
that he might have decided to run for a third term had there been no
constitutional amendment preventing it, and had he been able to foresee the
defeat of Richard M. Nixon. . . ."). However, shortly after the 1960 election,
while still serving as President, Eisenhower indicated that "on balance ... I
believe the two-term amendment was probably a pretty good thing." Dwight
D. Eisenhower, The President's News Conference of January 18, 1961, in
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1960-1961,
supra note 181, at 1045.
189. See MICHAEL R. BESCHLOSS, MAYDAY: EISENHOWER, KHRUSHCHEV
AND THE U-2 AFFAIR 3 (1986).
190. See DAVIS, supra note 163, at 406 (stating that "most political pundits
agreed that he [Eisenhower] would have easily won renomination and
reelection"). Political scientist James Sundquist is skeptical about how
seriously Eisenhower considered a third-term run, noting that "with his
history of serious illnesses and his belief that no man over seventy should
serve as president (he reached that age just before his second term expired),
[Eisenhower] would never have considered another race." SUNDQUIST, supra
note 121, at 132.
191 See STATHIS, supra note 31, at 47 n.139.
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were reelected ... [is placed] at such a disadvantage" in his
second term because of the limits of the Amendment. 192
As for Kennedy's successor, in his memoirs published
during Nixon's first term, Lyndon Johnson endorsed a single
six-year term for Presidents.1 93 In fact, proposals for a single
presidential term garnered some political attention during
Nixon's first term, and congressional hearings on the issue
were held in 1971 and 1973.194 Nixon himself indicated that
the six-year term should be further studied, 195 although he had
voted for H.J. Res. 27 while a member of the House of
Representatives. 196
In fact, his congressional vote notwithstanding, Nixon may
have been interested in repealing the Amendment. 197 This idea
had some popular currency after Nixon's reelection in 1972. In
March 1973, Projects for Peace, Inc., a New York advertising
agency, was hired by a voters organization, "Citizens for Nixon
'76," seeking repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment. 198 But
as revelations about the President's involvement in the
Watergate scandal became public the repeal movement quickly
ebbed.199
192. See John F. Kennedy, Television and Radio Interview: "After Two
Years-A Conversation with the President" (Dec. 17, 1962), in PUBLIC PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS: JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1962, at 892 (Warren R. Reid ed.,
1963). Kennedy also indicated that he had no regrets about supporting the
Amendment in 1947. See id.
193. Johnson argued that the "federal machinery" would be strengthened
by extending
the term of the Presidency from four to six years and mak[ing] the
incumbent ineligible for reelection. This stipulation almost became a
provision of our Constitution when it was originally written. The
case for it is even stronger in modem times. The growing burdens of
the office exact an enormous physical toll on the man himself and
place incredible demands on his time.
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE
PRESIDENCY 1963-1969, at 344 (1971).
194 See STATHIS, supra note 31, at 57.
195. See id. at 60.
196. See 93 CONG. REC. 872 (1947) (listing the yeas and nays for H.J. Res.
27).
197. Political scientist Paul Davis indicates that he was twice informed by
the leaders of "Citizens for the Repeal of the 22nd Amendment" that
"President Nixon... highly encouraged their activities to repeal the Twenty-
second Amendment." Davis, supra note 177, at 301.
198. See Four More Years More?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 5, 1973, at 20; STATHIS,
supra note 31, at 47.
199. Historian Harry Jeffrey has speculated that without Watergate the
Twenty-Second Amendment might very well have been repealed, allowing
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3. The Reagan Years
After 1972, the most recent serious repeal effort occurred
after Ronald Reagan's reelection in 1984.200 In September
1985, Reagan told a group of conservative state legislators that
it was "ridiculous" to prevent voters from sending Presidents to
office for more than two terms.201 During an interview the
following February, Reagan indicated that while no President
should advocate repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment
"with himself in mind," in the future "we ought to take a
serious look and see if we haven't interfered with the
democratic rights of the people" by limiting their ability to
choose a President.2 02
In 1986, Congressman Guy Vander Jagt (then Chairman
of the National Republican Congressional Committee) provided
an outlet for Republican interest in repeal that, the President's
protests notwithstanding, remained importantly linked to the
prospect of a third Reagan term. In July, Vander Jagt
introduced a joint resolution calling for a repeal of the Twenty-
Second Amendment.203 Although this measure eventually
obtained sixty-five co-sponsors, support for a third Reagan
term waned after revelations about the Iran-Contra affair.204
Nixon to seek and win a third term. See Larry Peterson, Richard Nixon: A
President Comes Home, History's Verdict Still in the Making, ORANGE
COUNTY REGISTER, July 15, 1990, at N1, available in 1990 WL 7657131
(quoting from interview with Harry Jeffrey).
200. See KYVIG, supra note 43, at 335 (stating that repeal efforts "were
renewed momentarily after Richard Nixon's election to a second term in 1972
and Ronald Reagan's in 1984"); see also Stathis, supra note 75, at 77-78
(providing general background on contemporary repeal efforts).
Between the 90th and 97th Congress (1967-1982) over fifty amendments
seeking to limit further the presidential term were introduced (typically
proposing a single six-year term). See STATHIS, supra note 31, at 57. In
addition, on April 27, 1979, President Carter informed a group of journalists
that he favored a single presidential term of six years instead of the eligibility
provisions of the Twenty-Second Amendment. "I think one six-year term
would be preferable. I think that if I had a six-year term, without any
prospect of re-election, it would be an improvement." Davis, supra note 177,
at 302. President Ford voted for the Amendment as a House member. See id.
201. Stathis, supra note 75, at 78.
202. Id. (quoting Ronald Reagan in an interview with Lou Cannon and
David Hoffman of the Washington Post, Feb. 10, 1986).
203. See H.R.J. Res. 687, 99th Cong. (1986).
204. The Gallup organization asked three questions gauging attitudes
about the Amendment during 1986. In August of that year Gallup asked:
"Have you heard or read about the proposal to repeal the 22nd Amendment to
the Constitution to enable a president to serve more than two four year
terms?" The respondents answered: Yes - 61%, No - 37%, and Don't Know -
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There seems to be mixed evidence about how seriously
Republican political forces considered the repeal effort in the
1980s, with some simply identifying it as an effective
fundraising effort or "gimmick."205 While political and popular
support for a repeal effort gained little headway after Reagan,
the 1986 movement contributed to an ongoing colloquy on the
issue, which carried over into the 1990s.
4. Opposition to the Twenty-Second Amendment After
Reagan
Although Ronald Reagan was the last President to serve
as a kind of figurehead for the repeal effort, interest in
abolishing the Twenty-Second Amendment has persisted, even
after he left office in 1989. Resolutions to repeal the Twenty-
Second Amendment have been introduced in every Congress
since 1991.206 In addition, a number of public officials-from
both major parties, and from all branches of government-have
2%. The same group was then asked: "Would you favor or oppose such a
proposal (to repeal the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution to enable a
president to serve more than two four year terms)?" The respondents
answered: Favor - 37%, Oppose - 60%, and Don't Know - 3%. Then in
September 1986, Gallup asked: "If this [Twenty-Second] Amendment were
repealed and presidents could run for more than two terms, would you like to
see President Reagan run for a third term, or not?" The respondents
answered: Yes - 39%, No - 58%, and Don't Know - 3%.
205. Stathis, supra note 75, at 80.
206. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 88, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.J. Res. 51, 105th
Cong. (1997); H.R.J. Res. 39, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.J. Res. 38, 105th Cong.
(1997); H.R.J. Res. 19, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.J. Res. 81, 104th Cong. (1995);
H.R.J. Res. 71, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 68, 104th Cong. (1995); S.J.
Res. 23, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 107, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R.J. Res.
101, 102d Cong. (1991).
The 1993 resolution and several others are notable not only for their
stated objective (eliminating the Twenty-Second Amendment) but also for the
way they characterize the application of the Amendment, and the
consequences of its repeal. Repealing the Twenty-Second Amendment would
remove "the restrictions on the number of terms an individual may serve as
President." H.R.J. Res. 107, 103d. Cong. (1993) (emphasis added). Like a
number of presidential term limit proposals of the past, the 1993 resolution
(among others) incorrectly equates presidential election with service. See also
H.R.J. Res. 71, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 19, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.J.
Res. 39, 105th Cong. (1997).
Also notable is that during 1993 and 1994 resolutions were introduced in
Congress providing "[n]o person may serve [as President, among other
positions] . . . either individually or cumulatively, for more than 12 years."
See H.R.J. Res. 277, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 324, 103d Cong. (1994).
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publicly criticized the Amendment and called for its repeal.207
Moreover, in recent years, a number of scholars have also
spoken out against the Amendment. 208 And popular enthusiasm
for repeal has been sufficient to generate at least one internet
site committed to undoing the Twenty-Second Amendment.209
Generally, critics have charged that the Amendment was
ill-conceived and needlessly restricts the democratic choices of
the electorate. It is also unpopular among some who believe it
hampers presidential effectiveness. But a number of
commentators have suggested that the Amendment is unlikely
to be repealed, at least "in the foreseeable future."210 Thus, the
question whether there are constitutional means to circumvent
the Amendment is not only an intriguing theoretical problem
but potentially an issue of future political significance.
207. For instance, former Senator and presidential candidate Eugene
McCarthy concluded in 1989 that "the current evidence is that the
amendment has served no national good." Eugene J. McCarthy, Give Bush
Another 100 Days, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1989, at A39. Abner Mikva, who
served for five terms in the United States Congress, for 15 years as a Federal
Appeals Court Judge, and as White House Counsel in 1994-1995, argued that
the "two-term limit" should be eliminated. "[Tihe notion of beginning a four-
year job as a lame duck thwarts an otherwise good system." Hat Trick,
WASHINGTONIAN, Mar. 1997, at 34 (interview of Mikva by Ken Adelman).
208. Political Scientist James W. Davis, for example, has argued that the
Amendment "makes a chief executive a lame duck the day after he is
reelected." See DAVIS, supra note 163, at 406. This view has also been
expressed by presidential scholar Gary L. Rose. See GARY L. ROSE, THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY UNDER SIEGE 135-37 (1997). Rose argues that "[t]o
further enhance the president's governing capacity, reformers should also
consider repealing the Twenty-Second Amendment" which turns the
President into a "lameduck leader." Id. at 135. Presidential historians
Michael Beschloss and Stephen Ambrose have attacked the Amendment even
more directly, saying "it should be repealed" and calling it a "damn fool thing
to do," respectively. The Second Time Around: An Exploration of Presidential
Second Terms, (Jan. 13, 1997) <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/forum/january
97/terms5.html>.
209. The site is identified as a "Grassroots Movement to Abolish the 22nd
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America," and can be
found at <http://www.trader.com/users/5011/1612/smtm.htm>.
210. Stathis, supra note 75, at 88; see also KYVIG, supra note 43, at 335.
Kyvig notes that steady
[concerns have been voiced about the amendment's negative
influence on a second-term president's power and effectiveness at
home and abroad, not to mention the people's sovereign right to their
choice of leaders. [And y]et to date every effort to initiate repeal has
collapsed in the face of perceived partisan benefit and the obstacles of
Article V.
THE TWICE AND FUTURE PRESIDENT
III. INTERPRETING AND APPLYING THE TWENTY-
SECOND AMENDMENT: ASSESSING THE SIX SCENARIOS
While the Twenty-Second Amendment has been referenced
in a number of litigation settings, neither the Amendment's
precise limits concerning its central subject (the reelection of a
President) nor the specific scenarios set out in this Article have
been tested in the courts.21' We proceed now to analyze the
application of the Twenty-Second Amendment and other
constitutional provisions to the "six scenarios" outlined at the
beginning of this Article, which represent the non-electoral
processes through which a twice-elected President might again
serve as President.
We divide Part III into two sections. First, we undertake
what can be described as a conventional legal and interpretive
analysis. Second, we consider the nature of legal arguments
211. Although a fair number of judicial opinions refer to the Twenty-
Second Amendment or describe it in passing, we could not find a single
reported decision truly "interpreting" the Amendment-by which we mean
deciding a case or controversy in a way that turns on divining the meaning of
the Amendment and determining its effects.
The Supreme Court has only occasionally mentioned the Twenty-Second
Amendment. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973) (citing the
Amendment in discussing the definition of a "person" under the Constitution);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 370 (1964) (finding a state oath requirement
unconstitutionally vague and asking, rhetorically, whether supporting the
repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment would be considered "subversive"
activity). Other courts have also had little to say about the Amendment,
although a number have cited it in term limit cases not involving the
presidency. See, e.g., Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1326 (Cal.
1991); State ex rel. Rhodes v. Brown, 296 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ohio 1973). In one
recent case the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on
its understanding of the Twenty-Second Amendment in deciding whether to
invalidate a California referendum limiting the terms of state assembly
members. See Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (en bane), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1302 (1998). There, the Court explained: "the twenty-
second amendment to the Constitution uses similar language: 'no person shall
be elected to the office of the President more than twice .... ' There certainly
is no confusion that this language imposes a lifetime ban on the office of the
President-even though the amendment does not specifically use the term
'lifetime.'" Id. at 846 (emphasis added). But, for reasons we discuss below,
the Court should have been confused about what the Twenty-Second
Amendment provides, for it is by no means clear that it effects a "lifetime ban
on the office of the President." Id. A similarly overreaching conclusion about
the Amendment was offered by another federal court. See Halperin v.
Kissinger, 434 F. Supp. 1193, 1195 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), affg in part, cert. dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981) (declining
to grant the relief requested because President Nixon "is prohibited by the




rooted in the "spirit" of the Constitution in general and the
spirit of the Twenty-Second Amendment in particular, and how
these arguments might apply to our scenarios.
A. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND AMENDMENT
Before proceeding with our constitutional analysis, it may
be helpful to recap the six ways in which a twice-elected
President might reassume Office despite the Twenty-Second
Amendment's prohibition against that person again being
"elected to the office of President." Scenarios 1 and 2 involve
situations in which a Vice President becomes President in the
event of the chief executive's death, resignation, or removal, or
acts as President during a period in which the chief executive
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the Office.
Scenarios 3 and 4 also involve the vice presidency, but
unlike Scenarios 1 and 2, these provide for the Vice President-
elect to become President if "at the time fixed for the beginning
of the term of the President, the President elect shall have
died,"212 or act as President if "a President shall not have been
chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if
the President elect shall have failed to qualifr." 213
Scenario 5 encompasses the circumstances provided for in
the Succession Act of 1947,214 which comes into play if the
President and the Vice President both die, resign, or are
unable to discharge their duties, or the President-elect and the
Vice President-elect are both constitutionally unqualified to
hold office. And Scenario 6 addresses the situation in which
the House of Representatives would "choose" a President in the
event that no person received a majority of the electoral votes
in an election for that Office.
We begin our evaluation of the constitutionality of these
scenarios by examining the text of the Twenty-Second
Amendment. We then consider the legislative history of the
Amendment and what insight it may provide in assessing the
scenarios. Next, we turn to constitutional provisions other
than the Twenty-Second Amendment that might assist us in
determining its application and scope. And we complete our
conventional interpretive analysis by considering the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. In each of
212. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.
213. Id.
214 3 U.S.C. §19 (1994).
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these subsections our focus is on the applicability of particular
constitutional provisions or principles to the scenarios in
general, although specific scenarios are discussed where one or
more of them warrant particular attention.
1. Text
Recall that the Twenty-Second Amendment specifies:
No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than
twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as
President, for more than two years of a term to which some other
person was elected President shall be elected to the office of
President more than once.2 1s
Notably, the text of the Amendment restricts only reelection of
an already twice-elected President.216 The words themselves
do not (1) limit the amount of time, consecutively or
cumulatively, a person may serve, or (2) proscribe such a
person from reassuming the Office of President by means other
than election. In this respect, the text of the ratified Twenty-
Second Amendment contrasts with the provisions of other
versions of the Amendment considered by Congress, including,
for example, the Senate Judiciary Committee's original
language, which categorically declared that a person serving or
acting as President "on three hundred and sixty-five calendar
days or more in each of two terms shall not be eligible to hold
the office of President, or to act as President, for any part of
another term." 217
It is also worth noting the Amendment's limit on
reeligibility (to a single reelection) of a person who has "served
as President for more than two years of a term to which some
other person was elected President." 218 Although the Amendment
does not detail the ways in which someone might assume the
presidency without being elected, this provision suggests those
adopting it were aware that the Constitution provides for such
a possibility.
These observations alone do not dispose of the question
whether any of our scenarios can withstand constitutional
215. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. We note, incidentally, that there seems to
be no constitutional prohibition against a twice-elected President simply
running for the presidency once again.
216. We have previously defined "twice-elected" to include a person elected
once "who has [also] ... acted as President, for more than two years of a term
to which some other person was elected." See supra note 3.
217. S. REP. No. 80-34, at 1 (1947).
218. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
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scrutiny. Nevertheless, they provide evidence that, on its own,
the text of the Twenty-Second Amendment does not preclude a
former president from assuming the presidency through any of
the six non-electoral paths to the presidency we have
identified.
2. Legislative History and Intent
Because the text of the Twenty-Second Amendment fails to
foreclose our six scenarios, we next consider the legislative
history of the Amendment to help assess their legality. We
acknowledge the difficulties of such an approach. There are
well-developed arguments outlining the perils of divining and
applying legislative intent when interpreting statutes. 219
These arguments seem no less telling when interpreting a
measure ultimately adopted as a constitutional amendment.
Indeed, in the context of the amendment process, the problem
of ascertaining legislative "intent" may be magnified by the
abundance of interpreters who have an opportunity to assess,
debate, and support (or reject) the proposed measure. Whose
intent counts in construing the legislative intent of an
amendment? The views of the Congress proposing the
amendment?220  The views of the states ratifying the
amendment?22 What if these diverge? Should we consider the
views of those states voting after an amendment has already
secured the constitutionally required ratification by three-
quarters of the states? All of the difficulties suggested by these
questions are compounded by observing that many of those
who ultimately support an amendment never give voice to
their reasons for doing so.
219. See generally Frank Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power
of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 87 (1984); Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1929-30); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 407 (1989); Stephen
Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 845 (1992).
220. Article Five provides: "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both
Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this
Constitution .... ." U.S. CoNST. art. V. An amendment may be enacted,
however, without Congress proposing it. See id. (providing that in lieu of
Congress's proposing an amendment, "on the Application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the several States . . . a Convention for proposing
Amendments" may be called). Yet each of the twenty-seven amendments to
the Constitution was proposed by Congress rather than a Convention.
221. Moreover, should the views of those states declining to ratify the
amendment be considered?
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Interpreting the legislative intent behind the Twenty-
Second Amendment comes with its own special set of problems.
First, the debates were typically marked by a failure on the
part of members of Congress to identify clearly either the
purposes of their amendment proposals or the ways in which
they hoped to effectuate the changes they sought. Second-and
no doubt related to the first problem--the debates featured a
remarkable lack of precision in choosing critical words. At
various times the objectives of limiting a President's "service,"
"terms," "tenure" and "[eligibility for] reelection" were
seemingly referenced interchangeably, as were a number of
phrases describing the procedures through which members of
Congress hoped to attain these ends. These different phrases
were employed without substantial attention to the
implications of these word choices, or to the several ways in
which the Constitution already provided terms and procedures
for election, succession, and other ways in which a person
might assume the Office of President without being elected.222
Third, it is significant that the congressional deliberations
about the Amendment generally have been considered
curtailed. The House debates took place under a restrictive
rule limiting debate to two hours (not a particularly long time
for an amendment to the Constitution), and a number of
commentators have suggested that neither the discussions in
Congress nor those in the state legislatures were particularly
extensive or informed.23
These observations about the difficulty of determining the
intent behind the Twenty-Second Amendment might suggest
that no conclusions can be reached with respect to the six
222. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §1; 3 U.S.C. §19 (1994).
223. Grimes refers to the rule under which the House considered H.J. Res.
27 as a "gag rule." GRIMES, supra note 43, at 116. Other commentators on
the debates of the Amendment have similarly concluded that they were
seriously truncated. Louis Koenig, for example, notes that "[flor all of its
controversial character, the amendment emerged from the House of
Representatives with but a single day's debate." KOENIG, supra note 43, at
65. Nor do the state ratification discussions appear to have been particularly
extensive, or to have stirred much public debate. The Nation noted that the
Amendment "glided through legislatures in a fog of silence-passed by men
whose election in no way involved their stand on the question-without
hearings, without publicity, without any of that popular participation that
should have accompanied a change in the organic law of the country." The
Two-Term Limit, NATION, Mar. 10, 1951, at 216-17. And Koenig observed
that the Amendment's "four-year journey through the state legislatures
stirred a minimum of public discussion." KOENIG, supra note 43, at 65.
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scenarios under which one may serve as President without
being elected to that Office. There are, however, aspects of the
congressional debates that affirmatively suggest at least some
of these scenarios were contemplated (and not foreclosed) by
those adopting the Twenty-Second Amendment. Like its text,
the legislative record of the Amendment reflects some
awareness that individuals can assume the Office of President
without being elected. 224 Missing from the legislative record,
however, is evidence that anyone debating the Twenty-Second
Amendment anticipated an individual being elected President
and subsequently acting as President or becoming President
through non-electoral means. Nevertheless-and notwith-
standing the Senate's gradual narrowing of its focus to
reelection-members remained conscious of the difference
between being elected President on the one hand and assuming
that Office (temporarily or for the duration of the term of
another) on the other.
In the end, we do not mean to suggest that it is impossible
to uncover any legislative purpose from the debates on the
Twenty-Second Amendment. The problem is that the one
evident purpose-to prevent another President from serving
four consecutive terms, as FDR had-is so specific and lacking
in nuance that it is of little service in evaluating the
constitutionality of our six scenarios. Indeed, identifying this
legislative purpose tells us nothing about the permissibility of
our scenarios under the Twenty-Second Amendment.225 And
yet the imprecision and relative brevity of the debates make it
difficult to discern another (more illuminating) objective
genuinely shared by those supporting the Amendment. On the
whole then, we conclude that the congressional debates on the
224. As the Senate Judiciary Committee explained in its report, "[fit was
the thought of the committee that the original [House] language did not
adequately care for a contingency that might occur under both the language of
article II of the Constitution as well as the twentieth Amendment thereof,"
namely, that a person might serve as President or acting President without
having been elected. S. REP. No. 80-34, at 2 (1947).
225. In discussing how a person might succeed from the vice presidency to
act as or become President, Congress seems to have touched on at least part
of Scenario 1 during its deliberations on the Twenty-Second Amendment. The
congressional debates do not appear to have engaged our other scenarios,
however. In the case of Scenarios 2 and 5 this is hardly surprising, since
neither the Twenty-Fifth Amendment nor the Succession Act of 1947 had yet
been enacted. Less clear is why Congress failed to touch upon the issues
raised by Scenarios 3, 4, and 6.
[Vol. 83:565616
19991 THE TWICE AND FUTURE PRESIDENT 617
Twenty-Second Amendment do not provide a basis for
declaring any of our scenarios unconstitutional.2
6
3. Other Constitutional Provisions
We turn now to provisions of the Constitution other than
the Twenty-Second Amendment and other than the provisions
directly related to the six scenarios 227 relevant to analysis of
the constitutionality of our scenarios: the Twelfth Amendment
and the "Guarantee Clause" of Article IV, Section 4.228 We
consider these provisions in light of their historical purposes
and meaning, as well as their relationship to the Twenty-
Second Amendment and the Constitution as a whole.
a. The Twelfth Amendment
The Twelfth Amendment provides, in part, that "[n]o
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall
be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States."
229
Prior to the Amendment's adoption the system for presidential
election outlined in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution
failed to differentiate between votes for presidential and vice
presidential candidates. Instead, electors simply voted for two
individuals and the person receiving the most votes was made
President while the next highest vote-getter became Vice
President.
226. We have focused almost exclusively on the debates in Congress. A
comprehensive history of the Twenty-Second Amendment would also trace the
ratification debates in the states. Our limited research in this area indicated
that the state ratification debates were generally curtailed and press coverage
of those debates spotty. See generally Brown, supra note 160, at 447; KYVIG,
supra note 43, at 328; DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 243 (1966); Stathis, supra note 75, at 71; The Two-Term Limit,
supra note 223, at 216-17.
Of course, the nature of the debates in the states was quite different from
those in Congress, for the states were deciding only whether to approve the
proposed Amendment, not what language it should contain. Nevertheless, we
assume the states' debates would have something useful to say about the
presumed meaning and implications of the proposed Amendment.
227. See supra notes 10-18.
228. U.S. CONST. amend. XII; id. art. IV, §4. Although these provisions
traditionally have not been the subject of much litigation, we believe they are
relevant to a comprehensive analysis of our scenarios. It is conceivable that
the courts' treatment of these provisions may change in the future. Moreover,
interpretation is not a task only for the courts; nonjudicial actors also bear a
responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution-even those parts of it
that courts are rarely asked to consider or have been held nonjusticiable.
229. Id. amend. XII.
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The Twelfth Amendment was ratified in response to
political turmoil surrounding the election of 1800. When
Republican candidates Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr each
received seventy-three electoral votes, the election of 1800 was
thrown to the House of Representatives. 2 30  The House
eventually selected Jefferson, "but not before Federalist
mischief-makers kept the election uncertain through thirty-six
ballots," resulting in soured relations between Jefferson and
Burr, his Vice President.23 1  Dissatisfied with these
developments, and drawing on a suggestion made by Alexander
Hamilton, Congress endorsed, and by 1804 the states ratified,
the Twelfth Amendment.232 The Amendment requires that
electoral votes be cast separately for President and for Vice
President.
Presumably, because presidential and vice presidential
candidates were not formally distinguished prior to the
Twelfth Amendment, anyone elected as Vice President was
also qualified to be President.233 However, once the Twelfth
Amendment bifurcated the selection process for President and
Vice President it apparently seemed necessary to stipulate
that a person ineligible to be President was also ineligible to be
Vice President.
What is the relationship between the Twelfth and Twenty-
Second Amendments? Does the Twelfih Amendments eligibility
provision prevent someone twice elected President from
serving as Vice President, thereby foreclosing Scenarios 1-4
(those in which a Vice President or Vice President-elect can
ascend to the presidency without being elected to that Office)?
We believe the Twelfth Amendment does not bar any of
these four scenarios. First, it is by no means clear that the
term "eligibility" as used in the Twelfth Amendment refers to
or incorporates a person's reeligibility under the Twenty-
Second Amendment. At the time the Twelfth Amendment was
written there was, of course, no Twenty-Second Amendment;
230. See MORISON ET AL., supra note 28, at 145.
23L MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 43, at 413; BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra
note 39, at 63.
232. See BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 39, at 63-65.
233. While the Constitution did not delineate candidates for President and
Vice President before the Twelfth Amendment, political practice certainly did.
During the first two presidential elections, for example, John Adams was
clearly elected to serve as Vice President to George Washington. See
generally MLKIS AND NELSON, supra note 43, at 98-99, 411-13.
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therefore, the Twelfth Amendment could not have originally
meant to preclude someone from being Vice President who had
been elected President twice. Rather, the Twelfth Amendment's
reference to "eligibility" likely pointed only to the "eligibility"
provision of Article II, Section 1, clause 4, which states that
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States ... shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall
any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to
the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident
within the United States.2
4
Second, even if the Twelfth Amendment's eligibility
provision is to be read in light of the proscriptions of the
Twenty-Second Amendment, it could be read as affecting only
persons who would become President. If this understanding is
correct, the Twelfth Amendment's provision that "[n]o person
constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be
eligible to that of Vice President of the United States"235 has no
effect on individuals who might simply act as President. In
other words, a Vice President "constitutionally ineligible to the
office of President" might occupy the vice presidency and
eventually act as President, while being ineligible to assume
that Office by becoming President through succession. This
interpretation would seemingly rule out Scenarios 1 and 3,
while still allowing for Scenarios 2 and 4.
Third, and most importantly, even under the most
expansive reading of what constitutional "eligibility" might
include-a reading that superimposes the Twenty-Second
Amendment on the Twelfth-there are good reasons for
thinking that the constitutionality of the scenarios would
remain unaffected. As we have been suggesting throughout
this Article, we do not believe an already twice-elected
President is "constitutionally ineligible to the office of
President." Even if one leaves aside Scenarios 1-4,236 there are
234. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1, cl. 4 (emphasis added). This reference to
"eligibility" is the only one found in the body of the original (unamended)
Constitution. Edward S. Corwin has suggested, however, that Congress may
add to the eligibility and qualification requirements of Article II through
legislation. See CORWIN, supra note 43, at 42.
235. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (emphasis added).
236. We leave these aside with the understanding that the argument an
already twice-elected President should not be considered "constitutionally
ineligible to the office of President" because he or she can assume that office
through succession from the vice presidency may seem circular. After all,
that person's very ability to serve as Vice President depends on his or her
being eligible for the Office of President.
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other non-electoral means of reassuming Office available to a
twice-elected President (viz., Scenarios 5 and 6). Thus, if the
meaning of "eligibility" under the Twelfth Amendment was
transformed with the adoption of the Twenty-Second
Amendment, the Twenty-Second Amendment still does not
render twice-elected Presidents "constitutionally ineligible to
the office of President," and it therefore cannot be said that the
Twelfth Amendment prohibits a twice-elected President from
serving as Vice President.237
b. The Guarantee Clause
Another constitutional provision warranting attention is
the so-called "Guarantee Clause," which provides: "The United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government .... 238 With origins dating
back to ancient Greece, the concept of "republicanism" has
been connected with a variety of different political principles
and institutional arrangements,2 39 and consistently contrasted
with monarchic rule.240
In the American context, the republicanism of the
Constitution has been associated with a commitment to
popular rule.241 The Guarantee Clause was designed to ensure
237. We recall that Eisenhower and his advisors considered the
advisability of his running as Vice President in 1960 and apparently
presumed he was ineligible to reassume the presidency through succession if
the elected President (Nixon) needed to be replaced. See our discussion supra
notes 180-90 and accompanying text. Why Eisenhower's advisors thought he
could serve as Vice President even while ineligible to be President is unclear,
and our efforts to determine the answer by contacting the Eisenhower
Presidential Library and the National Archives turned up nothing about the
issue.
238. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
239. Compare NICCOL) MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES (Bernard Crick
ed., 1970) (emphasizing the importance of civic virtue as the basis for a
republican polity), with THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) (describing
Madison's account of republican government). See generally J.G.A. POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975).
240. Cf. THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 433-34
(1991) ("Whereas a traditional king enjoys personal authority over his
subjects and rules his realm as his personal possession, government in a
republic is in principle the common business (res publica) of the citizens,
conducted by them for the common good.").
241. The most sustained and important early account of republican
government and its relationship to the Guarantee Clause comes from James
Madison. Madison identified a republican government as one "which derives
all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is
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that this principle was protected in the individual states.242
Thus, the Clause pledges that the "United States shall guarantee
to every State ... a Republican Form of Government."243
Although there is little judge-made law about the meaning
of the Guarantee Clause,2" we believe the commitments it
embodies arguably are challenged or undermined by a variant
of our scenarios. 245 We therefore turn to that situation.
administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited
period, or during good behavior." THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 241 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
242. Madison conceded that the precise character of republicanism could
vary- "Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms,
they have a right to do so and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter.
The only restriction imposed on them is that they shall not exchange
republican for anti-republican Constitutions." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 275
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
243. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added).
244. In a long line of cases the Supreme Court has held that the Clause is
enforceable only by Congress, and therefore that claims turning on the
meaning or interpretation of the Clause are nonjusticiable. See, e.g., Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
Regardless of whether one reads a given judicial opinion as failing to declare
that the Clause is non-justiciable, taken together the fact that the federal
courts have been unwilling to interpret the Clause seems evident. Cf. Akhil
Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty,
Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 749, 753
(1994) (arguing that Luther did not establish the "general nonjusticiability of
the Clause"). For a discussion of state court and lower federal court decisions
addressing the Clause, see Thomas C. Berg, Comment, The Guarantee of
Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial Review, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
208, 214 & n.3 (1987).
245. Judicial reticence about the Clause does not render it meaningless.
After all, it is neither descriptively accurate nor theoretically tenable to assert
that judges are the only interpreters of the Constitution. See generally Scott
E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the
Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359 (1997) (arguing for a diffusion of
interpretive powers among both judicial and nonjudicial actors); Michael S.
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law
Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). Moreover, in recent years numerous
commentators have both argued courts should reach the merits of at least
some claims based on the Guarantee Clause and advanced particular
conceptions of what the Clause means. Many of these arguments were
presented on March 18, 1994 at a conference entitled "Guaranteeing a
Republican Form of Government," held at the University of Colorado School of
Law. The articles from that conference are collected in 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
709 (1994). See also Berg, supra note 244, at 214-16; Thomas A. Smith, Note,
The Rule of Law and the States: A New Interpretation of the Guarantee
Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 561 (1984). Finally, judges themselves may someday
reconsider the view that they should refrain from interpreting the Guarantee
Clause. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184-85 (1992) (stating
that despite "[tihe view that the Guarantee Clause implicates only
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Reconsider our preceding discussion in which we posited
that a twice-elected President might be elected Vice President
and then reassume the Office of President. Specifically,
suppose that an elected President immediately resigns (or
otherwise steps aside) with the understanding that the Vice
President (former President) will reassume his or her "rightfil
office. This variant of our scenarios246 could occur either with
the ex ante awareness of the electorate (and complicity of
enough of the electorate to ensure election of the presidential
"proxy"), or as a covert activity, of which the public is informed
only after-the-fact. Can either version of this purposeful effort
to avoid the strictures of the Twenty-Second Amendment be
condemned under the Guarantee Clause?
As noted, the Guarantee Clause provides that the "United
States shall guarantee to every State... a Republican Form of
Government, 247 which suggests that this guarantee primarily
"runs from the United States to the individual states."2 48
Given the Clause's reference to the states, it would be
understandable to conclude that a challenge to even the
purposeful substitution of a duly elected President in the
federal electoral process does not implicate the Guarantee
Clause. Yet, insofar as the states indirectly, through the
electoral college, elect the President of the United States,249 one
nonjusticiable political questions ... [miore recently, the Court has suggested
that perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause" are nonjusticiable).
246. This situation would most likely arise under Scenario 1, which
specifically provides for succession in the case of resignation, but the former
President could act as President under similar variants of Scenarios 2, 3, and
4.
247. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added).
248. Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous
States: A New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 815 (1994).
249. See Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. RPv. 249, 312
n.207 (1997) ("Without the intervention of the State legislatures, the
President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases
have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of
themselves determine it.") (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 291 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); see also Shlomo Slonim, Designing the
Electoral College, in INVENTING THE AJmERICAN PRESIDENCY 33-60 (Thomas E.
Cronin ed., 1989) (providing background on the framers' debates on the
electoral college and noting a number of ways in which the college was
designed to reflect the interests of the states); GARY L. MCDOWELL, CURBING
THE COURTS 80 (1988) ("By giving the states a voice in the selection of the
president.., the Constitution allows for regional opinions and interests to be
introduced into the public forum. In this way, the prevailing popular opinion
of each state is not excluded from national affairs ... .").
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might conclude that a purposeful effort to substitute another
person for the President-elect undermines the Clause's
guarantee of a republican form of government. Understood in
this way, the Clause may be read not only to provide a
"guarantee" to the individual states250 but also to forbid
constituting the federal government in a manner that conflicts
with the principles of republican government.251
Nevertheless, we are skeptical that such substitutions
would encroach upon republican principles in a manner (or to
an extent) that violates the Clause. For instance, where the
substitution plan is carried out with the ex ante knowledge of
the electorate, allowing the former President to reassume
Office would seem to facilitate rather than frustrate the
democratic will (and serve as a way of circumventing an
amendment that may not allow the public to elect the person
they most want to serve as President). Therefore, this
substitution would be at odds with republican principles only if
those principles valued the formalities of democratic procedure
above the genuine fulfillment of popular sentiment.
In contrast, the covert version of the substitution plan is
plainly in tension with the republican commitment to majority
rule.25 2 Yet even in this situation, although the public would
not have known of the former Presidents intention to
reassume the presidency, the electorate would have implicitly
sanctioned that person's return to Office through succession by
electing him or her as Vice President. In addition, the
reassumption of Office by the former President would not
250. See Hans A. Linde, Who is Responsible for Republican Government?,
65 U. COLO. L. REV. 709 (1994) (explaining that the Clause "committed the
states to republican government and committed the nation to guarantee
them") (emphasis added).
251. Indeed, it would seem strange were the Constitution to commit the
United States to ensuring that the states have republican forms of
government and at the same time allow the United States to be constituted or
governed contrary to the principles of republican government.
One can imagine, however, that the Guarantee Clause does not reference
federal arrangements because the remainder of the Constitution is dedicated
to constructing the federal system, and presumably the Constitution's express
provisions were designed to reflect republican principles. For discussions of
the Founder's views about the Clause and its inclusion in the text, see Berg,
supra note 244, at 226.
252. See Amar, supra note 244, at 753 ("he concept of Republican
Government does have a central meaning, intimately connected with popular
sovereignty and majority rule.").
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forestall the end of the presidential term and the opportunity
for the electorate to exercise its will again.253
In view of this, our account of the Guarantee Clause does
not suggest a basis for concluding that any other variant of our
six scenarios would pose a constitutional problem. Having an
already twice-elected President serve again in that Office by
virtue of being Vice President or Vice President-elect in
Scenarios 1-4 would not, in itself, subvert popular rule.
Similarly, on their own, Scenarios 5 and 6 would not offend
republican principles; under these scenarios only the
reassumption of Office by a twice-elected President in a
manner avoiding or overturning popular will would potentially
implicate the Guarantee Clause.
4. The Separation of Powers
Having examined specific constitutional provisions we
turn now to consider whether the principles associated with
the "separation of powers" doctrine inform an assessment of
the constitutionality of our six scenarios. But identifying the
appropriate separation of powers principles to apply is no
simple task. To begin with, although ensuring a separation of
powers was clearly an objective of the Founders they did not
include specific separation of powers provisions in the
Constitution.254  The ultimate source of the doctrine of
253. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. The importance of fixed terms in preserving
republican rule is stressed by Madison in The Federalist Papers. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 39, at 240-41 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(describing the features of "the republican form" by examining the state
constitutions, and noting that in the states "the tenure of the highest offices is
extended to a definite period").
254. The Federalist case for the division of the federal government into
three separate departments was made most systematically and forcefully in
The Federalist Papers. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47-51 (James Madison).
The division of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers into separate
branches of government was seen as a way to protect the people against
tyrannical rule. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny."). But the American separation of powers
system was also designed to define (inexactly) the limits and scope of the legal
(and political) powers and functions of the various branches, in a way that
would give each branch specialized responsibilities and keep power
accountable and efficient. See James Ceaser, In Defense of Separation of
Powers, in SEPARATION OF POWERS-DOES IT STILL WORK? 168 (Robert A.
Goldwin and Art Kaufman eds., 1986); William B. Gwyn, The Separation of
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separation of powers has been identified as discrete portions of
the Constitution by some, and as the entire document (as well
as additional sources) 255 by others. Thus, when constructing
and applying separation of powers principles one cannot rely
on the Constitution's text in the same way one can in many
other interpretive endeavors.
An additional challenge is presented by the fact that the
relevant jurisprudence addressing separation of powers
arguments is somewhat conceptually untidy and difficult to
categorize. Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has
applied the doctrine in diverse and sometimes seemingly
inconsistent ways. Legal commentators attempting to make
sense of the Court's decisions have suggested that
contemporary separation of powers doctrine is marked by a
struggle between functional and formalist approaches. 25
6
Under the functional view, "the Court emphasize[s] checks and
balances" and eschews strict divisions between various
departments and their powers.257 The Court embraces a
"fimctional" approach by recognizing that the separation of
powers is necessary to preserve "the essential functions of each
branch" but that rigid boundaries between the branches are
neither desirable nor possible.258 Alternatively, under the
formalist view, the Court acknowledges "[tihe fundamental
necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments
of government entirely free from the control or coercive
influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others."259
Powers and Modern Forms of Government, in SEPARATION OF POWERS-DOES
IT STILL WORK?, supra, at 74.
255. See E. Donald Elliot, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence is
So Abysmal, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 506, 508 (1989) ("In a sense, the 'text' in
separation of powers law is everything that the Framers did and said in
making the original Constitution plus the history of our government since the
founding.").
256. See Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside the
Courts, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 57 (1990) (contending that the Court's jurisprudence
has shifted between formalistic, rigid reading of separation of powers and a
more flexible, pragmatic approach which appreciates the need for overlap and
competition in the assignment of constitutional powers).
257. Id. at 58.
258. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707-13 (1974); see also Fisher,
supra note 256, at 58.
259. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935); see
also Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution of
Subsequent De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 BYU L. REV. 719
(defending the formalist approach).
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Under either approach, is there reason to believe any of
the scenarios we have presented run afoul of separation of
powers principles? For instance, recalling our now-familiar
example, what if upon nearing the end of her second term a
previously twice-elected President desired to avoid the
strictures of the Twenty-Second Amendment and continue in
office for a third term-=r perhaps longer? Might the extension
of that President's tenure collide with separation of powers
tenets by, for example, augmenting the President's power at
the expense of Congress?
Irrespective of how improbable this and similar scenarios
might seem, we are unconvinced that separation of powers
concerns alone could render them unconstitutional. After all,
there was no limit on presidential service prior to ratification
of the Twenty-Second Amendment in 1951, and no one, to the
best of our knowledge, seriously suggested before then that
serving more than two terms was unconstitutional. Should
separation of powers principles be applied differently today (or
in the future) than they were before 1951? Did the enactment
of the Twenty-Second Amendment transform the relationship
of the federal departments in a way that constitutionally
forbids what was previously permitted?
We concede that the meaning of a constitutional provision
may be altered by a subsequent amendment (and even that
separation of powers principles may be altered by amendments
to the Constitution and other changes). Nevertheless, we find
no authority in the text of the Twenty-Second Amendment
itself, in the congressional debates surrounding its proposal
and ratification, or among any other evidence, to suggest that
the Amendment was designed to, or did, alter the allocation of
federal powers so profoundly that separation of powers
concerns preclude a twice-elected President from reassuming
the Office of President even though not prevented from doing
so by the terms of the Amendment itself.260
260. In addition, from a practical standpoint, procedural and political
realities substantially constrain the circumstances under which the
reassumption of Office by a twice-elected President could occur. Thus, we do
not envision the reassumption of Office by a previously twice-elected
President as capable of fundamentally altering the balance of power and
responsibilities among the three branches of the federal government.
Therefore we are untroubled in this regard by the prospect of a former
President again serving as President for however long circumstances might
permit.
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B. THE TWENTY-SECOND AMENDMENT AND THE "SPIRIT" OF THE
CONSTITUTION
Having engaged in a conventional analysis of the Twenty-
Second Amendment's text and the relevant legislative record,
and having examined other constitutional provisions as well as
separation of powers principles, we have not yet found a
compelling basis for concluding that a twice-elected President
could not serve again through the non-electoral means we have
identified. One might contend, however, that we have failed to
consider an obvious basis for arguing against at least some
variants of the scenarios we have outlined-namely, that
allowing an already twice-elected President to reassume Office
could amount to an end-run around the Twenty-Second
Amendment, thereby undermining the "spirit" of the
Amendment, the entire Constitution, or both. Although we
have doubts that the scenarios discussed here can be found
unconstitutional under a conventional interpretive analysis,
can some of them be declared unconstitutional if judged
contrary to the Constitution's spirit?
Consider again a situation in which a previously twice-
elected President ran as Vice President with the
understanding that if elected, the President-elect would step
aside and allow the twice-elected President to serve another
term. Would this contravene the spirit of the Twenty-Second
Amendment or the Constitution generally 2 61  Might the
261. In reflecting on these efforts to have a twice-elected President
reassume Office despite the dictates of the Twenty-Second Amendment, one
might also consider Article H, section 1, clause 8 of the Constitution, which
specifies that "[b]efore [the President] enters on the Execution of his Office,"
he shall take the following "Oath or Affirmation": "I do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United
States and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States."
The Clause invites us to contemplate what is entailed in "preserving,"
"protecting," and "defending" the Constitution. If we are to take the pres-
idential Oath Clause seriously we must consider whether an already twice-
elected President could subsequently act as or become President without
betraying that oath. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (containing the Const-
itution's other oath clause, which provides: "The Senators and Representatives
.*. and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution....").
The oath clauses seemingly seek to ensure that the official actions of
constitutional officers comport with the commands of the Constitution. See
DAvID MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 47, 94 (1966); JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §1844
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answer to this question depend on whether the American
public is aware the President-elect plans to resign? Or would
it matter if the twice-elected President intended to be Vice
President and reassumed the presidency only upon the
unforeseen death, resignation, removal or disability of the
President-elect? The answer to these questions, we believe,
may be gleaned by investigating the nature of "spirit"
arguments generally and applying them to the topic at hand.
There have long been suggestions that one might separate
the spirit of the law from its letter. Both The Federalist262 and
the Supreme Court 263 provided numerous early (if ambiguous)
reflections on how analysis of the Constitution's "spirit" might
apply to interpretation of the document. In assessing the
power of Congress to charter the second Bank of the United
States, Chief Justice John Marshall offered his famous test of
constitutionality which drew on the letter-spirit dichotomy:
(5th ed. 1891). In the view of one commentator, "tihe Constitution [through
its oath clauses] requires the President and the members of Congress to
independently evaluate the constitutionality of their actions." K.G. Jan Pillai,
Phantom of the Strict Scrutiny, 31 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 397, 451 (1997).
Nevertheless, it does not appear that a President's commitment to the oath
would be compromised by reassuming Office under any of our six scenarios.
First, as a practical matter, the presidential Oath Clause itself has never been
the basis for invalidating any statute or official act. Second, even if the oath
does commit a President to acknowledging the supremacy of the Constitution
and accepting an independent responsibility to interpret the Constitution
there are good reasons to believe (as we have argued throughout this Article),
that the reassumption of Office comports with the Twenty-Second
Amendment and the Constitution generally. Therefore, it does not seem as
though an already twice-elected President's return to the Office would
constitute a failure to preserve, protect or defend the Constitution.
262. The Federalist Papers makes a few references to the "spirit" of
Constitution, but these references do not give particular insight into the
question of how to construe the concept. For instance, Federalist No. 81
defends the Supreme Court against the charge that it will construe "the laws
according to the spirit of the Constitution... [in a way that will] mould them
into whatever shape it may think proper." THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 482
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
263. See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword to The Constitution of Change:
Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 51
n.91 (1993) (lUp through 1840, the Supreme Court used some version of the
letter-spirit dichotomy 86 times . . . ."); cf. Kent Greenfield, Original
Penumbras: Constitutional Interpretation in the First Years of Congress, 26 U.
CONN. L. REV. 79 (1993) (discussing the Founders' arguments based on the
spirit of the Constitution); William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners
and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L REV. 491, 498 (1994)
(explaining that "many of the founding generation were 'anti-literalists' who
believed constitutions should be interpreted in light of their spirit") (footnote
omitted).
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Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.2"
That same year, the Court also asserted that "the spirit of an
instrument, especially of a constitution, is to be respected not
less than its letter."26 5 And nearly a half century later the
Court, invoking the Constitution's spirit, condemned an act of
Congress as interfering with the right to contract
notwithstanding that the Constitution forbade only states from
such interference. As Chief Justice Chase explained:
It is true that this prohibition [of the Contracts Clause]2 is not
applied in terms to the government of the United States ....
But we think it clear that those who framed and those who
adopted the Constitution, intended that the spirit of this prohibition
should pervade the entire body of legislation, and that the justice
which the Constitution was ordained to establish was not thought by
them to be compatible with legislation of an opposite tendency. In
other words, we cannot doubt that a law not made in pursuance of an
express power, which necessarily and in its direct operation impairs
the obligation of contracts, is inconsistent with the spirit of the
Constitution. 267
Although judicial appeals to constitutional spirit may be
less frequent than in years gone by, the invocations have not
ceased.268 Perhaps the most recent prominent suggestion that
the Constitution's spirit matters in the interpretive process
came from Justice O'Connor in her dissent in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, where she declared:
The spirit of the Tenth Amendment... is that the States will retain
their integrity in a system in which the laws of the United States are
nevertheless supreme.
264. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,420 (1819) (emphasis
added).
265. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819).
266. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
267. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 623 (1869); see also Sinking-Fund
Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 744 (1878) ("[A] law which violates the spirit of the
Constitution is as much unconstitutional as one that violates its letter.")
(Bradley, J., dissenting); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: Civil War and Reconstruction, 1865-1873, 51 U. CHi. L. REv. 131, 182
(1984) (referring to Chase's decision and explaining that "Marshall had
encouraged such an interpretation by his reference to the 'spirit' of theConstitution7).
268. See Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74
TEX. L. REV. 795, 816 (1996) (discussing references to the "spirit" of the
Constitution in the interpretive process).
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It is not enough that the 'end [of Congress] be legitimate'; the
means to that end chosen by Congress must not contravene the spirit
of the Constitution."2
Notwithstanding the Court's continuing invocation of the
Constitution's spirit-and its likewise persistent suggestion
that the Constitution's spirit has some content independent
from (although perhaps related to) the Constitution's text-we
are aware of no sustained judicial or scholarly discussions that
elucidate how text and spirit relate to one another or how the
question of "spirit" should be applied in constitutional analysis.
We agree with those commentators who have observed that the
actual substance of the letter-spirit dichotomy is somewhat
elusive.270 And although a full exploration of the subject of the
Constitution's spirit is beyond the scope of this Article,27 1 we
offer a sketch of what an analysis of the "spirit" of the
Constitution might entail.
It strikes us there are two general tacks for construing the
"spirit" of the Constitution. Under the first conception, the
Constitution's "spirit" is linked with basic principles that
precede, inform, or limit interpretation and application of the
constitutional document. The notion that there are such
principles has numerous historical and scholarly adherents
and is sometimes associated with claims that the Constitution
rests on "natural law" principles. 272 The idea seems generally
consistent, for example, with Justice Chase's suggestion in
Calder v. Bull273 that in addition to the explicit commands of
the Constitution, there exist "certain vital principles in our free
269. 469 U.S. 528, 585 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
270. See Horwitz, supra note 263, at 51 n.91; see also Gardbaum, supra
note 268, at 816 ("As far as I am aware, the Supreme Court has never
explicitly discussed the question whether the 'spirit' of the Constitution is
part of the Constitution for interpretive purposes .... ").
271. A more exhaustive treatment of the Constitution's spirit would have
to address comprehensively a number of questions, including: (1) is there such
a thing as the Constitution's spirit?; (2) how is the spirit to be identified?; (3)
does, or should, the spirit play a role in interpreting the Constitution (and can
it ever be identified with sufficient particularity to serve as a basis for
adjudication)?; (4) if the spirit is relevant to constitutional interpretation,
what role should it play?; (5) can the Constitution's spirit ever displace or
trump textual provisions?; and (6) if the Constitution's spirit is capable of
trumping its text, are all textual provisions equally amenable to being
trumped, or are some more susceptible than others?
272. See GARY JACOBSOHN, THE SuPREME COURT AND THE DECLINE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION 67-69 (1986) (arguing that there is a connection
between natural law and nderstanding the spirit of the Constitution).
273. 3 U.S. 3 (Dall.) 386 (1798).
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Republican governments, which will determine and overrule
an apparent flagrant abuse of legislative power."274
Under the second approach, the Constitution's spirit must
be gleaned from its specific provisions (with some provisions
perhaps more important than others). Gilbert Paul Carrasco
and Peter W. Rodino argue, for example, that the
Constitution's preamble should be consulted for insight into
the overall "spirit" of the Constitution, for it gives the
"document as a whole its direction" and in this way enhances
constitutional interpretation. 2 5  Unlike the "exogenous,"
background principle conception outlined above, this
"endogenous" conception is based on the understanding that
whatever one construes as the constitutional spirit must arise
from the existing provisions of the Constitution. In the words
of Chief Justice Marshall, "the spirit [of the Constitution] is to
be collected chiefly from its words."276
We believe that neither conception of the Constitution's
spirit provides a basis for declaring unconstitutional the
scenarios under which an already twice-elected President may
reassume that Office. This conclusion is not based on the belief
that the spirit of the Constitution is irrelevant to constitutional
interpretation, nor is it based on the belief that spirit alone can
never be the basis for declaring something unconstitutional.
Rather, it is based on the particular conviction that spirit alone
is not dispositive of the issues we examine here and does not
rule out any of the ways in which an already twice-elected
President might again assume that Office (or at least the six
ways we have identified).
Consideration of the Constitution's spirit does not suggest
an entirely different constitutional outcome than that provided
274 Id. at 388. That Justice Chase considered these principles somehow
prior to the letter of the Constitution is suggested in his further assertion that
"[an act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great
first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise
of legislative authority." Id.
275. Gilbert Paul Carrasco & Peter W. Rodino, Jr., "Unalienable Rights,"
the Preamble, and the Ninth Amendment: The Spirit of the Constitution, 20
SETON HALL L. REV. 498, 508-09 (1990). Carrasco and Rodino actually
suggest that the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble should both
serve as bases for discerning the Constitution's spirit. See id. at 509.
276. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819). This
notion, of course, presents additional questions about the Constitution's spirit:
What portions of the Constitution are relevant to determining its spirit?
Assuming the Constitution's spirit is based on the existing text, can the spirit
be transformed through amendments?
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by conventional legal analysis with respect to a question as
central as: who may serve as President of the United States,
and under what circumstances? It is difficult to imagine, for
instance, that a twice-elected President should be prevented
from reassuming Office based on a notion about the spirit of
the Constitution if it is clear that the reassumption of Office
would be permitted on all other interpretive bases.277
But this conclusion does not leave us without a
constitutional basis from which to criticize some of the
scenarios we have presented. Although arguments founded on
the spirit of the Constitution are insufficient to hold our
scenarios unconstitutional, one still might object to the
scenarios for failing to comport with the sensibilities our
Constitution and constitutional system have engendered. For
example, in considering a conscious effort to circumvent the
proscription of the Twenty-Second Amendment and install
President Clinton for a third term, we might condemn such an
undertaking based on constitutionally-inspired expectations or
convictions, while stopping short of declaring it unconstitutional.
Borrowing a phrase from Stephen Carter, this and other
end-runs around the Twenty-Second Amendment would
seemingly amount to "constitutional improprieties."278
Although these improprieties are not foreclosed by the
Constitution from a strictly legal standpoint, they may be
challenged on other bases, including arguments informed by
277. Were the issue to arise, it likely would be difficult to isolate claims
based on spirit from those based on "conventional" interpretative modalities.
But to the extent an argument against non-electoral reassumption of office is
predicated only on the spirit of the Constitution, we are disinclined to
conclude such concerns could, or should, render the proposed reassumption of
Office unconstitutional.
278. Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on
Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357,
391-92 (1990). What Carter calls a constitutional impropriety is
an official act that a court ought not or does not forbid but that
nevertheless is contrary to the spirit of the document, as reflected in
the document's history and in its role in the constitutional story that
We the People of the United States, tell about ourselves. A
constitutional impropriety, although not identical in a positivist
sense to an unconstitutional act, is every bit as offensive to the
Constitution, and ought therefore to be every bit as troubling to those
who care about constitutionalism.
Id. at 391-92. Carter's phrase and argument are useful insofar as they offer a
framework for thinking about acts that may not be unconstitutional but may
nevertheless offend constitutional principles and our sensibilities about what
is advisable under our constitutional system.
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constitutional principles and commitments.279 The conclusion
that the Constitution does not forbid an act does not establish
that the act comports with Constitution-based values and
arrangements. In addition to engaging in legal analyses we
can, and we should, debate the virtues of proposed acts,
drawing on ideas and ideals shaped by our constitutional
system. In so doing, we may avoid constitutional improprieties
beyond the reach of our laws--even our supreme law.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis leads us to the belief that the Twenty-Second
Amendment and the Constitution as a whole leave open
possibilities for a previously twice-elected President to
reassume that Office. This prospect creates the potential for
mischief. For instance, we have suggested that a President
nearing the end of his or her second term and determined to
stay in office might run as Vice President with the idea that
the President-elect would step aside, allowing the already
twice-elected President (and Vice President-elect) to serve a
third term without running afoul of the Twenty-Second
Amendment's bar on reelection.280 Regardless of whether such
a plan was pursued with the knowledge of the electorate, there
would be inevitable conflict over its legality and wisdom.
But the possibility of an already twice-elected President
reassuming that Office also presents opportunities of potential
benefit to the polity. Consider the applicability of our
scenarios to Congress's responsibility to provide for
presidential succession after the Vice President. A number of
commentators have charged that the Succession Act of 1947
may supply a chief executive of questionable popular
legitimacy and with uncertain political prospects.28' If these
279. Presumably, there would also be non-constitutionally-inspired
political and policy arguments against those trying to circumvent the Twenty-
Second Amendment.
280. The twice-elected President might even choose a "running mate" who
did not meet one or more of the presidential qualifications listed in Article H,
thereby automatically triggering the provisions of Twentieth Amendment,
section three, allowing the Vice President-elect to act as President through
the process described in Scenario 4.
281. Allan Sindler has argued that a succession statute should provide "a
rapid and stable process which will produce a successor considered legitimate
and acceptable by the public." ALLAN P. SINDLER, UNCHOSEN PRESIDENTS 10
(1976). Former President Harry S. Truman argued that "any man who
stepped into the presidency should have at least some office to which he had
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are legitimate concerns, one might begin to correct them by
enacting a new succession statute that allows former
Presidents, including previously twice-elected Presidents, to
act as President during a crisis. Instead of providing, for
example, that the Speaker of the House or the Secretary of
Energy shall assume the Office of President should the need
arise,282 why not tap an ex-President as temporary presidential
caretaker?2 83 Such an individual would have a reservoir of
experience and familiarity with demands of the Office, which
could aid the nation in a crisis.2 84
Regardless of whether readers subscribe to our conclusions
(or our views about the potential mischief and opportunities
flowing from them) we hope our analysis has made clear that
the Twenty-Second Amendment is less simple and clear than is
presumed by many, and that it fails to provide definite
answers about important questions. Given this, and in view of
the fact that the Twenty-Second Amendment allows scenarios
for continuing presidential service that were likely unimagined
and surely unaddressed by those who drafted and ratified it, it
is difficult for us to avoid the conclusion, suggested by our
earlier discussions of the congressional debates, 285 that the
Amendment was poorly written.
But we do not believe that the Twenty-Second Amendment
should hastily be repealed or amended. Rather, we counsel a
fuller exploration of the Amendment so that its implications
may be better understood. There is inherent value in
understanding even the Constitution's less frequently debated
been elected by a vote of the people." See JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING
HANDS 204 (1965) (quoting Harry S. Truman).
282. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1994). We have noted in another article, see Gant &
Peabody, supra note 8, that there is a compelling argument that the
succession statute is unconstitutional. See generally Akhil Reed Amar &
Vikrain David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48
STAN. L. REV. 113 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of
Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155 (1995).
283. The succession legislation would need to specify how a choice would
be made between a number of ex-Presidents.
284. If the measures we have described here sound implausible to even the
most imaginative of readers, we submit that while they might never occur
under "ordinary" political circumstances, they might be deemed as acceptable
alternatives during emergencies, especially if it was felt that the leadership of
a twice-elected incumbent was necessary in overcoming a crisis. Indeed, as
we have seen, FDR and his supporters made something of this argument in
supporting his candidacy in 1940 and 1944. See supra Part 1.C.
285. See supra notes 135-65 and accompanying text.
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and litigated provisions. Moreover, such an exploration has
practical value because some set of circumstances may yet call
into question the meaning of the Twenty-Second Amendment.286
Presumably, political and popular expectations would
discourage the reassumption of Office, even temporarily, by an
already twice-elected President. Yet, as with the "two-term
tradition" that preceded the Twenty-Second Amendment,
existing expectations and perceived customs do not always
constrain future political behavior; whatever reluctance there
is to sanctioning a reassumption of the presidency may
someday be tested and ultimately overcome.
286. Eisenhower's apparent consideration (however briefly) of running as
Vice President suggests the plausibility of a set of circumstances that might
test the meaning of the Twenty-Second Amendment. Moreover, when
President Clinton's second term expires on January 20, 2001, he will be the
youngest American President to have completed two terms. This will leave
him with at least the opportunity for continuing his career in public service.
Although seemingly implausible given Clinton's impeachment and trial before
the Senate as this Article goes to print, were Clinton someday to be elected
Vice President, or to serve in some other position putting him in line for
presidential succession (viz., certain positions in Congress or the Cabinet), the
strictures of the Twenty-Second Amendment might well be put at issue.
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